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gricultural market liberalization has been the subject of numerous studies by
IFPRI and other research organizations. Recent and forthcoming IFPRI re-
search reports on this topic include studies of maize marketing in the Philippines by
Meyra Mendoza and Mark Rosegrant,of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement by Dean
DeRosa, of groundnut market liberalization in Senegal by Ousmane Badiane et al.,
and of Egyptian wheat market reforms by Mylène Kherallah et al.
The case of rice market liberalization in Viet Nam is interesting and distinctive in
three ways. First, Viet Nam is in the midst of a transition from a centrally planned
economy to a market-oriented one. The very success of this process in stimulating
economic growth and rice exports created a situation in which policymakers and re-
searchers had only a partial picture of the newly transformed rice marketing system.
Second, rice is both the most important export crop in Viet Nam and the dominant
staple food. The dual role of rice in the economy created an apparent contradiction
between food security objectives and the desire to promote exports. The political sen-
sitivity of rice export policy is heightened by the memory of rice exports in the first
half of the 20th century that coincided with periods of deprivation and even famine.
Third, Viet Nam’s agroclimatic diversity and long distances imply that the effects
of rice policy will vary widely by region. This diversity further complicates the task
of anticipating the effect of changes in rice policy on poor and vulnerable households.
In this study, Nicholas Minot and Francesco Goletti examine the new patterns of
rice marketing in Viet Nam and study how liberalizing both internal and external rice
markets has affected food security and poverty. For the first task, they make use of a
comprehensive set of surveys carried out by IFPRI in 1995–96. These surveys, cov-
ering rice producers, traders, millers, and state-owned enterprises, provide a detailed
picture of the new rice marketing system in Viet Nam.
For the second task, they assess the household-level impact of rice policy by com-
bining a spatial equilibrium model with household survey data. The spatial equilib-
rium model is used to simulate the effect of rice policy on food markets in seven agro-
climatic regions of Viet Nam. The survey data are then used to estimate the impact
of simulated price changes in each region on real income and poverty among differ-
ent groups of households.
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ForewordThe results suggest that export liberalization does raise rice prices within the coun-
try, but that the effects are smaller (in percentage terms) as one moves away from the
rice export zone. Furthermore, the higher prices have a positive effect on rural in-
come and a mixed but slightly favorable impact on poverty. Furthermore, relaxing
restrictions on the internal movement of rice from south to north also generates net
benefits for the country without increasing poverty.
The results of the analysis in this report were presented to Vietnamese policy-
makers in late 1996, leading them to enact a succession of increases in the rice
export quota and to lift restrictions on internal rice trade. In the wake of these re-
forms, rice prices have been stable or declined and internal trade in rice has risen,
showing that sound policy research can lead to beneficial policy actions.
It is important to stress that the specific findings of this study are not necessarily
applicable to other countries that export a staple food crop. Under different circum-
stances, policymakers may face a more serious trade-off between exports and rural
poverty. The study does, however, indicate that the effects of market reform on
poverty are not always intuitive. More important, it provides a methodological tool
for examining the impact of agricultural trade and marketing policy on poor house-
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his report focuses on market liberalization in the rice sector of Viet Nam and its
impact on income and poverty. This topic is of interest for several reasons. First,
the transition from central planning to a market-oriented economy in Viet Nam has
been more extensive and more rapid than in many other nations. Second, on an ag-
gregate level, the reform of the rice sector has been successful in transforming the
country from a rice importer to a major exporter. Third, rice policy is important to
the 76 million inhabitants of Viet Nam because rice accounts for three-quarters of
the caloric intake and is grown by more than two-thirds of Vietnamese households.
And finally, since Viet Nam now supplies 9 to 17 percent of world exports, the
prospects for exports have important implications for world rice markets.
The main objective of this report is to examine the new set of food policy issues
facing Viet Nam as a result of its transformation into a major rice exporter and its
transition toward a market economy. In particular, the report aims to shed some light
on two key issues: (1) What would be the effect on income and poverty of further
liberalization of rice markets in Viet Nam? (2) What lessons can other countries learn
from market liberalization in Viet Nam?
The liberalization of Vietnamese agriculture has proceeded in a series of small
steps in response to poor agricultural performance and reduced assistance from the
Soviet Union. Reforms began in 1980 with the introduction of the contract system,
accelerated in 1988 with the devolution of decisionmaking to the farm household,
and were complemented by liberalization of other sectors in the early 1990s. These
reforms have generated impressive results, with rice production and the agricultural
sector growing at close to 5 percent per year.
Rice production in Viet Nam is characterized by small irrigated farms, multiple
cropping, labor-intensive practices, and growing use of inorganic fertilizer, though
there are substantial regional differences. The Mekong River Delta is the rice bowl
of Viet Nam, producing about half of national output on relatively “large” farms of
1.1 hectare. The Red River Delta is one of the most densely populated agricultural
areas in the world. Although farms average only 0.25 hectares, the Red River Delta
manages to produce rice surpluses, though they are much smaller than those of the
xi
SummaryMekong. Rice cultivation is less intensive in the other regions, but rice is by far the
most important staple in every region.
More than 57 percent of the rice production growth during 1985–95 was ac-
counted for by yield growth, with rice area actually declining. Crop intensification
(increasing the number of crops per year) and interaction among these factors ac-
counts for the rest. Although all regions have seen impressive rice production growth,
the Mekong Delta accounts for two-thirds of national growth.
There is little potential for expansion of rice area and only minimal potential for
further intensification. Rice output growth will increasingly rely on yield expansion.
Yield growth has far exceeded the Asian average, probably reflecting lagged re-
sponse to liberalization. Thus, yield growth can be expected to fall in the coming
years.
The structure of the rice marketing system in Viet Nam suggests that it has rap-
idly developed into a complex system without the central management that policy-
makers once thought was necessary. Tens of thousands of traders handle millions of
tons of rice every year, channeling it from surplus farmers to urban consumers, ru-
ral rice-deficit areas,and exporters. Furthermore,the channels are numerous and dif-
fer from one region to another. The role played by the state-owned enterprises in the
rice marketing system is minimal, except in the area of long-distance trade, where it
dominates, and exports, where it has a legal monopoly.
As the overall economy has stabilized, rice prices have become less volatile, but
market liberalization does not seem to have had a noticeable effect on marketing mar-
gins between paddy and rice prices,between farm and retail prices,or between prices
in the north and south of the country. Spatial market integration analysis indicates
that the degree of market integration has increased somewhat since the late 1980s,
but it remains weak.
Two types of restrictions on trade affect the performance of the marketing system.
First, internal trade was restricted in 1995, as indicated by the responses of traders
in a 1995–96 IFPRI survey and by the large price differential between rice prices in
the north and south. Second, the rice export quota is used by the government to en-
sure adequate domestic supplies. This report compares domestic and border prices,
finding that the rice export quota was binding at least over the period 1990–95 and
that it was equivalent to an export tax of 20 to 25 percent.
Rice is by far the most important staple in the Vietnamese diet, accounting for
more than 60 percent of the caloric intake in every region. Per capita rice consump-
tion is lower among urban households than rural ones. In addition, rice consumption
rises with income at low and middle income levels, but it falls as income rises fur-
ther. Econometric analysis of household data carried out in this study suggests that
the expenditure elasticity of rice demand is 0.38 at the mean income level, while the
price elasticity is –0.24.
In order to understand how a rice policy affects the poor,the distribution of poverty
in Viet Nam is examined. Poverty is almost four times as widespread and five times
as severe in the rural areas as in the urban areas. Furthermore, poverty tends to be
concentrated in the more remote, hilly regions, namely the North Central Coast, the
xiiNorthern Uplands, and the Central Highlands. Household survey data suggest that
the two delta regions, with 45 percent of the population, are surplus regions that
would gain from higher rice prices; the other five regions are rice-deficit areas that
would lose on average. Higher prices would also benefit the average rural household
at the expense of urban households.
A uniform 10 percent increase in rice prices would hurt urban households, non-
farmers, and residents of the five deficit regions, although the effect on real income
would be less than 2 percent on average. On average, the price increase would ben-
efit farmers, particularly those in the Red River and Mekong deltas. Somewhat par-
adoxically, in spite of the higher average income, the poverty rate would rise slightly
from 25.0 to 25.2 percent in the long run.
A simulation model, the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model, was
constructed to examine the impact of alternative rice marketing policies on prices,
production, consumption, and income. The impact on poverty is estimated by com-
bining the results of the simulations with household data on rice marketing patterns.
With regard to the rice export quota, the model indicates that there is some justi-
fication for the concern of the Vietnamese government that eliminating rice export
quotas would raise prices and hurt some Vietnamese households. The model confirms
that rice prices would rise 14 to 22 percent (depending on whether internal restric-
tions were also removed) and have an adverse effect on urban households, nonfarm
rural households, and households in the Central Highlands. For example, according
to the 1992–93 Viet Nam Living Standards Survey, the poorest quintile of urban
households spends almost one-third of their income on rice.
At the same time,the model shows that the net gains to rice farmers and consumers
would be around US$200 million. Three-quarters of this gain would represent a
transfer from state-owned enterprises exporting rice and one-quarter a net gain to the
country. Furthermore, poor households tend to gain both in absolute terms and rela-
tive to nonpoor households because they are predominantly rural farmers who ben-
efit from higher rice prices.
The government could liberalize rice exports slowly by replacing the quota with
an export tax and gradually reducing the tax rate. The model indicates that a 22 per-
cent tax would be equivalent to the 2.5 million tons quota. This option has the ad-
vantage of generating revenue that could be used to alleviate the impact of higher
rice prices through targeted assistance.
With regard to restrictions on the internal movement of food, the model suggests
that the impact on average prices and incomes would be relatively small. Nonethe-
less, the absolute gains are large compared with the negligible costs of such a pol-
icy. Removing restrictions on internal trade would have substantial regional effects,
however,lowering prices in the north and raising them in the south. The distributional
effects are relatively small and tend to cancel each other, so there is no change in the
national poverty rate.
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ver the past 20 years,market liberalization has been a dominant feature of eco-
nomic reforms in developing countries. In the early 1980s, the adoption of
more market-oriented policies was an important component of the structural adjust-
ment programs adopted by developing countries. This trend has been extended to a
new set of countries since 1989 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the east-
ern bloc.
The process of market liberalization, however, has not been free of controversy.
Perhaps the most common criticism is that market liberalization is said to have had
adverse effects on the poor through layoffs in formerly-state-owned industries,higher
food prices, and the erosion of social safety net programs (Cornia, Jolly, and Jolly
1987).
Higher food prices may result from price deregulation, removal of subsidies, de-
preciation of an overvalued exchange rate,relaxation of compulsory government pro-
curement policies,or removal of export controls. Higher food prices almost certainly
have a negative impact on the urban poor, since they spend a relatively large share of
their budgets on food. But the effect of higher food prices on the rural poor is am-
biguous because they are both producers and consumers of staple foods.
The impact of food prices on the welfare of the poor has been the topic of nu-
merous studies. Mellor (1978) noted that the direct welfare effect of higher food
prices depends on the net sales position of the household: net sellers, such as com-
mercial farmers, gain, while net buyers, such as urban consumers and landless rural
households, lose. Other studies show a surprisingly high proportion of net food buy-
ers among rural households in developing countries (Weber et al.1988; Sahn 1988;
and Barrett and Dorosh 1996). Deaton (1989) combines household data and hy-
pothesized price changes to study the distributional effect of higher rice prices that
would result from export liberalization in Thailand. Similar methods were adopted
in studies of the distributional effect of higher food prices in Côte d’Ivoire (Budd
1993) and in Madagascar (Barrett and Dorosh 1996).
Computable general equilibrium models have been widely used to examine the im-
pact of policy on different household groups (for example, see Bourguignon, de
Melo, and Morrison 1991). These models are able to simulate the indirect effects of
1
CHAPTER 1
Introductionpolicy via changes in labor markets, land prices, or feedback from nonagricultural
sectors. The distributional analysis in these models is, however, usually limited to
four to eight household types.
This report focuses on market liberalization in the rice sector of Viet Nam and its
impact on poverty. The topic is of interest for several reasons. First, as a country in
transition from central planning to a market-oriented economy, the process of liber-
alization has been more extensive and more rapid than in many other nations. Sec-
ond, on an aggregate level, the reform of the rice sector has been successful in trans-
forming the country from a rice importer to a major exporter. Third, the importance
of rice policy to the 76 million inhabitants of Viet Nam is evident from the fact that
rice accounts for three-quarters of the caloric intake and is grown by more than two-
thirds of Vietnamese households. And finally, since Viet Nam now supplies 9 to 17
percent of world rice exports, Vietnamese rice policy and the prospects for exports
have important implications for world rice markets. The next section provides some
background on the importance of rice in Viet Nam and the evolution of rice policy.
Rice in Viet Nam
Rice has played a central role in the lives of the people of Viet Nam for several thou-
sand years. The Chinese and Vietnamese kingdoms that ruled the region are judged
by historians, and presumably by their subjects, by their ability to ensure a steady
supply of rice to the population. Prosperous periods, such as the early years of the
Ly Dynasty (1009–1225),were noted for their investments in irrigation and dike con-
struction, while the decline of kingdoms was often presaged by the collapse of irri-
gation systems, leading to food shortages and unrest (Vien 1993).
Large-scale rice exports began in the early 20th century with the installation of
large irrigation works in the Mekong Delta under French colonial authority. Tenant
farmers in the Mekong produced surpluses, allowing Viet Nam to export 1 to 2 mil-
lion tons in the 1920s and early 1930s. Under Japanese occupation during World War
II, Viet Nam was obligated to supply Japan with 0.9 to 1.0 million tons of rice per
year. These exports coexisted with periods of extreme deprivation and hardship, cul-
minating in a famine in 1945–46 in which as many as 600,000 may have perished
(Vien 1993, 227). This experience helps explain the sensitivity of policymakers to-
day to the food security implications of rice exports.
Rice continues to play a central role in Vietnamese agricultural production and
food consumption. Paddy is grown on 53 percent of the agricultural land in Viet Nam,
and it represents 64 percent of the sown area of crops.1 Rice has recently become the
second largest export, accounting for more than 10 percent of the total value. Ac-
cording to the 1992–93 Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (VLSS), 69.9 percent of
2
1 The term “paddy” in this report refers to unmilled rice, although technically unmilled upland rice is not consid-
ered paddy.Vietnamese households grow rice and 99.9 percent consume rice.2 As already men-
tioned, rice accounts for three-quarters of the caloric intake of the average Viet-
namese household.
Thus, it is not surprising that the performance of the rice sector continues to be an
important criterion by which the Vietnamese judge government policy. The stagna-
tion of rice production and food shortages in the first decade after unification (1976–
86) were perhaps the most important catalyst for questioning the superiority of so-
cialist forms of production. Under the doi moi (renovation) policy announced in De-
cember 1986, the government began to give markets a greater role in the allocation
of resources in the economy. The first reforms were implemented in 1988 in the agri-
cultural sector, decentralizing responsibility for agricultural management from col-
lectives to farm households. These reforms were followed by other measures to stim-
ulate exports, encourage savings, and open the country to foreign investment.
The success of these reforms in the rice sector were dramatic: within a few years,
Viet Nam had transformed itself from a chronic rice importer to one of the three
largest rice exporters in the world. The dramatic success of the reforms in stimulat-
ing rice production and exports made it easier for pro-reform elements in the gov-
ernment to push for market-oriented reforms in other sectors (see Pingali and Xuan
1992).
Rice policy continues to be the subject of intense debate in Viet Nam, as it is in
many Asian countries (Sicular 1989). Policymakers give high priority to ensuring ad-
equate incomes for rice farmers and sufficient supply of affordable rice to consumers.
The policy issues facing Viet Nam have changed as a result of its new status as a ma-
jor rice exporter. Although the food shortages that plagued the country in the 1980s
have receded, the government faces new trade-offs between generating foreign ex-
change from rice exports and maintaining low prices for domestic consumers.
In spite of the relaxation of government control over rice production and market-
ing, until recently important restrictions on rice exports and internal rice trade have
been in place. The most important of these restrictions are a binding export quota on
rice and various restrictions on rice trade between regions. In addition, state-owned
enterprises continue to enjoy a legal monopoly on rice exports. In part, these re-
strictions reflect a desire to maintain adequate supplies for domestic rice consumers,
particularly the poor. The restrictions also reflect a residual suspicion of private
traders and doubts regarding the ability of the market to serve the needs of produc-
ers and consumers. Finally, there is a fiscal incentive to maintain the current system
since the rice-exporting state-owned enterprises contribute part of their profits to the
government.
As discussed later, however, it is likely that Viet Nam will be required to liberal-
ize rice export policy when it joins the World Trade Organization. Thus, it is impor-
3
2 The VLSS was carried out by the State Planning Committee and the General Statistical Office, with support from
the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Swedish International Development Agency.tant to understand the impact of alternative rice liberalization policies on income,
prices, and poverty.
Objectives
The main objective of this report is to examine the new set of food policy issues fac-
ing Viet Nam as a result of its transformation into a major rice exporter and its tran-
sition toward a market economy. In particular, the reports aims to shed light on two
key questions:
1. What would be the effect on income and poverty of further liberalization of rice
markets in Viet Nam?
2. What lessons for other countries can be learned from market liberalization in
Viet Nam?
The achievement of this objective can be organized into three tasks. First, the re-
port aims to describe the patterns of rice production and marketing in Viet Nam. The
rice marketing system has evolved rapidly in recent years, responding to both sub-
stantial increases in marketed surplus and liberalization of marketing policy. The new
patterns of rice production and marketing have important implications for the impact
of policy on household welfare.
Second, the report attempts to assess the performance of the rice marketing sys-
tem in Viet Nam. This is accomplished by examining marketing costs,the movement
of prices in different markets at the same time, and the relationship between price
differences across markets and transportation costs between them. Particular atten-
tion is paid to differences in market performance across regions and between private
traders and state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Third, the report examines the impact of alternative rice marketing policies on
prices, incomes, production, and consumption in different regions and for different
groups of the population.
Methodology
A variety of methods is used to address the various research tasks. The methods com-
bine descriptive analysis, time-series analysis, and economic modeling to draw pol-
icy conclusions. Time series methods are used to study trends and variability of the
main variables of interest,such as prices and production. Time series models are also
used in the study of market integration. Finally, a multimarket spatial equilibrium
model of Vietnamese food markets is the main tool used to conduct a series of pol-
icy experiments. Each method will be further explained in the following chapters.
The database used in this study combines secondary and primary data. Secondary
data such as prices, production, trade, and macroeconomic indicators were obtained
from Viet Nam’s General Statistical Office, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural De-
velopment,and Ministry of Trade. Primary data collection was geared to obtain mar-
4keting information that is not available from secondary sources. Four categories of
market participants were interviewed: farmers, traders, millers, and SOEs.
The sample selection was designed to represent the rice marketing system of all
seven regions of Viet Nam. The sample was stratified by region, and for each region,
several provinces were selected in order to capture various characteristics such as the
importance of rice production and marketing, remoteness from main markets, close-
ness to border trade, and agricultural diversification out of rice. Seventeen provinces
were selected and, within each province, at least two districts were identified. The
sample includes 1,388 farmers, 850 traders, 852 millers, and 36 SOEs. Traders,
millers, and SOEs were interviewed in two rounds to capture seasonality. The first
round took place between November 1995 and February 1996, while the second
round took place between March and June 1996.
Organization
Chapter 2 examines the patterns of rice production and the policy context in Viet
Nam. It provides some historical background, studies the sources of growth in rice
production since 1985,and summarizes the seasonal and geographic patterns in Viet-
namese rice production.
Chapter 3 studies the structure and performance of the rice marketing system in
Viet Nam. It uses the IFPRI survey of traders and millers to describe the marketing
channels by which rice moves from the farm to domestic consumers and exporters.
The chapter also provides several measures of the performance of the Vietnamese rice
marketing system.
Chapter 4 looks at the patterns of rice demand in Viet Nam. In addition to de-
scriptive statistics on rice consumption behavior, an econometric model of food de-
mand is presented. This information is used to make simple projections of the trends
in rice demand over the coming decades,an issue with important implications for the
sustainability of Vietnamese rice exports.
Chapter 5 focuses on the effects of rice price changes on income distribution and
poverty. Household survey data are used to estimate which groups would gain and
which would lose from higher rice prices.
Chapter 6 uses the spatial equilibrium model to simulate the effect of rice market
policy options on income, prices, production, and consumption in each region.
Among the policy options considered are relaxation of the export quota, replacing
the quota with export taxes, and removing restrictions on the internal movement of
rice.
And Chapter 7 summarizes the results of the study, drawing conclusions with re-
gard to rice policy,constraints on the domestic and export market for Vietnamese rice,
and prospects for the future. In addition, recommendations are made with regard to
methods for studying the impact of marketing policy in other countries.
5I
n the 10 years following the introduction of the doi moipolicy (renovation),paddy
production in Viet Nam increased from about 16 million metric tons in 1986 to
over 26 million metric tons in 1996.3Examining the factors behind this growth is im-
portant both for understanding the transformation of the rice economy in Viet Nam
and for evaluating the potential for further expansion. The first section of this chap-
ter provides some background by reviewing the evolution of agricultural policy since
1975 when Viet Nam was reunified. Next, the characteristics of rice production in
different parts of the country are described. Third, growth in rice production is de-
composed by region and by area, yield, and cropping intensity in order to shed some
light on this transformation. The last section addresses the question of the potential
for further expansion in rice production in Viet Nam.
Evolution of Agricultural Policy
With the reunification of north and south Viet Nam in 1975, the government faced
the challenges of rebuilding from the war and extending the system of agricultural
collectives and state-managed industry to the south. With a unified and independent
country at peace for the first time in decades, expectations were high. The first five-
year plan (1976–80), however, was a failure: none of the 15 production targets was
met (Kim 1996,203). Food production,widely used in Viet Nam as a measure of gen-
eral welfare, was 31 percent below target and actually fell in per capita terms. For-
merly independent farmers in the Mekong Delta resisted cooperativization, and in
the north, there was growing recognition that the centralization of cooperative man-
agement was eroding farmer incentives. In response, the government promulgated
Directive 100 in 1981 under which cooperatives would contract farm households to
produce a given amount on their own plots, but any surplus could be sold on the
newly liberalized free market (Xuan 1995, 188). Farmers responded well to the new
6
CHAPTER 2
Rice Production and Policy Context
3 For the purposes of this report, all tons are metric tons.incentives: per capita food production grew from 273 kilograms in 1981 to 304 kilo-
grams in 1985, achieving 96 percent of the 1985 target.
In 1985–86, the fiscal deficit balooned as a result of the reduction in assistance
by the Soviet Union and the losses of SOEs. Rice production stagnated as hyper-
inflation eroded the real value of official rice prices,and rising production quotas fur-
ther reduced farmer incentives. In 1986, the government announced its intention to
move toward a more market-oriented economy, a policy known as doi moi (renova-
tion). The first concrete manifestation of this policy was Resolution 10 of 1988,
which recognized the farm household as the basic unit of agricultural production.
Farmers were allowed to buy,own,and sell agricultural inputs such as machines,buf-
faloes, and tools. Cooperative land was assigned to farming households for 10 to 15
years under different forms of contracts or bidding. Furthermore, farmers were al-
lowed to market 40 percent of contracted output. By 1989, compulsory government
purchase of farm products was eliminated, and private traders were allowed to pur-
chase directly from farmers (Pingali and Xuan 1992).
The results were dramatic: rice production grew 57 percent during 1985–95 or
4.6 percent per year; food production per capita increased from 307 kilograms of
paddy equivalent in 1988 to 349 kilograms in 1992 and to 372 kilograms in 1995;
and agricultural output grew at an annual rate of 5.1 percent between 1988 and 1995.
Stimulated by surpluses and more favorable exchange rates, Viet Nam began ex-
porting rice in 1989, rapidly becoming the third largest exporter in the world after
Thailand and the United States. In 1997,Vietnamese rice exports surpassed those of
the United States, making it the second largest in the world.
Market-oriented reforms were carried out in other sectors as well. The government
eliminated most direct subsidies and price controls, tightened government spending,
set interest rates positive in real terms, unified and devalued the foreign exchange
rate, and moved toward a more liberalized international trade. The government re-
duced subsidies to SOEs and exposed them to greater competition. As will be dis-
cussed later, however, SOEs continue to dominate certain sectors of the economy
(Plummer 1995; Irwin 1995; and Doanh and McCarty 1995). Furthermore, although
trade restrictions have been greatly reduced, the government limits trade through a
variety of administrative controls in a number of key sectors such as rice, fertilizer,
and sugar (see CIE 1998; Anderson 1998; and CIE 1999).
Characteristics of Rice Production 
Rice production in Viet Nam is characterized by multiple cropping, small irrigated
farms,labor-intensive practices,and widespread use of fertilizer. This section briefly
describes the pattern of rice production. Although there is considerable regional vari-
ation,this report focuses on production systems in the Mekong and Red River deltas,
where two-thirds of Vietnamese rice is grown.
7Geographic Distribution of Rice Production
Although Viet Nam is a major rice producer, only a small proportion of its territory is
suitable for rice cultivation. Less than a quarter of the surface of Viet Nam is agricul-
tural land, most of the remainder consisting of mountainous areas. Of the agricultural
land in Viet Nam, however, over half is dedicated to rice production (Table 1). T a b l e   1
The Vietnamese compare their country to a d-òn gánh, a pair of baskets suspended
from a pole. The two rice baskets of Viet Nam are the Red River Delta in the north
and the Mekong River Delta in the south, connected by a relatively narrow strip of
land (see Figure 1). Although the two deltas represent barely 15 percent of the na-
tional territory, they account for more than two-thirds of national rice production.f i g u r e   1
The Red River Delta is the cradle of the Vietnamese culture. Wet rice cultivation
was established there as early as 2000 bc,and by 600 bcinhabitants of the Delta were
irrigating rice fields using the tidal motion of the rivers and a complex system of dikes
and canals (Bray 1986; Cosslett and Shaw 1987). Today it is one of the most densely
populated agricultural regions in the world, with more than 1,000 inhabitants per
square kilometer, even after excluding Hanoi. The farms are quite small (averaging
0.25 hectare) and intensely cultivated (the cropping intensity ratio for rice is 1.8).
Rice is grown by 95 percent of the rural households and accounts for 81 percent of
agricultural land. The Red River Delta represents 18 percent of national rice pro-
duction and produces a surplus of several hundred thousand tons for shipment to sur-
rounding regions (see Table 1).
In contrast to the Red River Delta,large-scale rice cultivation in the Mekong River
Delta is a relatively recent phenomenon. At the turn of the century, the French colo-
nial authorities embarked on a large canal-building project to develop the region for
rice production (Vien 1993,166). This is reflected today in the lower population den-
sity (401 inhabitants per square kilometer), larger farms (1.26 hectares), and a lower
cropping intensity. Because it is much larger than the Red River Delta, the Mekong
accounts for more than half of Vietnamese rice production. Between 1995 and 1998
it generated a rice surplus ranging between 4.5 and 6 million tons per year, most of
which is exported while the remainder is shipped to other regions of the country.
The rest of Viet Nam is divided into five regions. In these regions, a large major-
ity of rural households grow rice, but the yields and cropping intensities are lower
than in the two deltas. As a result, all five are rice-deficit regions. The Northern Up-
lands is a cool, hilly region bordering China on the north and Laos on the west. It is
one of the poorest regions, and ethnic minorities represent a large share of the pop-
ulation. Irrigated rice is grown in the narrow mountain valleys and upland rice on the
slopes, but the average yields and cropping intensities are low. Livestock (particu-
larly pig production), cassava, and maize are important.
The North Central Coast consists of a narrow coastal plain and a chain of rugged
mountains. The coast is more developed and features irrigated rice in the river val-
leys, but the interior region is poor and sparsely populated. The South Central Coast
is similar,but somewhat more developed and has a sizable fishing industry. The Cen-
tral Highlands is a poor, sparsely populated region with very little commercial rice
8Table 1—Area, yield, and production of paddy in 1995
Sown
Total Agricultural land Cultivated rice area Cropping paddy Paddy Paddy production
Region area Area Percent Area Percent intensity area yield Yield Percent
(1,000 (1,000 (of total (1,000 (of agri- (ratio) (1,000 (tons/ (1,000 (of national
hectares) hectares) area) hectares) cultural land) hectares) hectare) tons) output)
North Uplands  10,297 1,741 16.9 578 33.2 1.40 808 2.79 2,254 9.0
Red River Delta 1,258 712 56.6 578 81.2 1.80 1,042 4.44 4,623 18.5
North Central Coast 5,118 670 13.1 414 61.8 1.65 682 3.14 2,141 8.6
South Central Coast 4,518 545 12.1 273 50.1 1.90 518 3.38 1,749 7.0
Central Highlands 5,618 629 11.2 131 20.8 1.32 173 2.48 430 1.7
Southeast 2,339 956 40.9 278 29.1 1.27 352 2.66 935 3.7
Mekong River Delta 3,956 2,654 67.1 1,951 73.5 1.64 3,191 4.02 12,832 51.4
Viet Nam 33,104 7,907 23.9 4,203 53.2 1.61 6,766 3.69 24,964 100.0
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Figure 1—Agroecological regions of Viet Nam
10production. Recently, the region has seen a boom in coffee production and a flow of
immigrants from other regions. The Southeast region includes Ho Chi Minh City,
making it the most urbanized and developed region. Agriculture in the Southeast is
less specialized in rice and includes fruit and vegetable production for the urban mar-
ket and for export, as well as a variety of agribusiness activities such as sugar, starch,
feed, and rubber.
Cropping Systems
The average rice cropping intensity in Viet Nam is 1.6, according to the General Sta-
tistical Office (GSO). The Agricultural Census of 1994 reports that out of total paddy
area,8.8 percent was triple cropped,55.2 percent double cropped,and 36 percent sin-
gle cropped (see GSO 1995b, Vol. 1, 55).4
Single-cropped rice includes both upland rice and lowland rainfed rice. Upland
rice is unirrigated and is planted on slopes where it is not possible to flood the fields.
It is mainly grown in the Central Highlands and the Northern Uplands, generally by
ethnic minorities. Often upland rice fields are burned, planted with rice for 2 to 3
years,and then left fallow for 8 to 20 years. The area planted with upland rice in 1993
was estimated at 450,000 hectares in 1993,or 6 percent of the total sown area of rice,
though the area affected by this practice is at least 10 times larger. Upland rice area
is declining (Arraudeau and Xuan 1995).
Lowland rainfed rice is also unirrigated, but it is planted where rainfall and to-
pography allow the rice fields to be submerged during at least part of the growing
season. A significant portion of the Mekong River Delta (600,000 hectares) is rain-
fed, particularly along the eastern coast and southern Ca Mau peninsula. Rice yields
are 2 to 3 tons per hectare. Lowland rainfed rice area is also declining as the irriga-
tion and drainage networks expand (Xuan et al. 1995).
Double cropping of rice is widespread in the Red River Delta,the river basins along
the central coast,and the Mekong River Delta. Double cropping may involve one rainy
season harvest and one winter-spring harvest. In the Red River Delta,the winter-spring
crop is planted in February and harvested in May-June, while in the Mekong this sea-
son occurs three months earlier. Alternatively,in the Mekong Delta and other irrigated
regions in the south, a double rice rotation may involve a rainy season crop and a
summer-autumn rice crop (planted in April-May and harvested in August-September).
In fact, the concept of crop seasons is somewhat artificial since rice is harvested
somewhere in Viet Nam every month of the year. As shown in Table 2, March is the
month with the largest harvest (about 22 percent of the total), and the four months
from May to August contribute an additional 46 percent of total production. Using
1995 production and an assumed consumption of 156 kilograms per capita, the rice
deficit can be estimated on a monthly basis, shown in the last column of Table 2. The
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4 Farm surveys suggest that triple rice cropping is practiced on about 5 percent of the rice land (Sub-NIAPP 1995),
implying that double-cropped rice accounts for 51 percent and single-cropped rice 44 percent.month of March generates a surplus of about 2 million tons, while the months of No-
vember to January are the lean months. The largest deficit (935,000 tons in Decem-
ber) can be interpreted as the minimum intrayear rice storage requirement consistent
with food security. T a b l e   2
Farm Size
Vietnamese farms are small. The average agricultural household has just 0.49
hectares of agricultural land (Table 3), and less than 12 percent of rural households
have more than 1.0 hectare. The number of rural households with no agricultural land
is small, as a result of the relatively equitable process of decollectivization. Accord-
ing to the 1994 Agricultural Census, less than 2 percent of the agricultural house-
holds had no land (Table 4). TABLES 3 AND 4
The problem of landlessness is growing, however, particularly in the Mekong
Delta. The 1993 Land Law allows households to sell, lease, mortgage, and inherit
land, leading some households to sell or lose their land when unable to repay loans.
Official statistics indicate that the proportion of landless households in the Mekong
12
Table 2—Seasonal distribution of production by region
Red North South Central Mekong National
Northern River Central Central High- South- River Viet rice
Month Uplands Delta Coast Coast lands east Delta Nam gap
(percent of annual production) (1,000
metric 
tons)
January 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 1.8 -715
February 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.3 0.0 0.0 11.6 7.3 46
March 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.8 16.3 24.6 36.0 21.7 2,051
April 0.0 0.0 6.6 8.0 17.0 7.3 7.3 5.4 -206
May 23.3 26.2 46.9 2.7 11.9 0.0 2.4 12.6 793
June 22.2 27.6 0.0 19.0 0.0 3.2 4.0 10.6 514
July 2.3 0.2 0.0 15.8 0.0 23.4 21.7 13.4 898
August 0.0 0.0 33.4 3.4 2.4 27.3 12.2 10.4 489
September 8.6 4.4 13.2 3.1 26.0 6.7 0.6 3.9 -414
October 25.1 35.0 0.0 0.8 12.4 0.0 0.0 9.0 292
November 18.5 6.6 0.0 0.0 6.4 6.4 0.8 3.6 -455
December 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 1.1 0.0 0.2 -935
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 2,357
Source: IFPRI 1996.
Note: The national rice gap refers to the gap between monthly production and monthly consumption, assum-
ing consumption of 156 kilograms per person per year. 13
Table 3—Average farm size and cultivated rice area by region
Agricultural Census 
(1994) VLSS (1992–93)
Region Farm size Cultivated rice area
(hectare/farm) (hectare/farm) (percent of 
agricultural land)
Northern Uplands 0.43 0.29 58.0
Red River Delta 0.23 0.23 92.9
North Central Coast 0.30 0.27 77.7
South Central Coast 0.41 0.27 69.2
Central Highlands 0.74 0.32 45.2
Southeast 0.92 0.63 85.7
Mekong River Delta 1.10 0.91 92.4
Viet Nam 0.49 0.41 79.8
Sources: Agricultural Census data from GSO 1995b,Vol. 1, 92, 96, 100, 104, 108, 112, 118, 122. Other columns
calculated based on data from GSO 1994.
Note: The VLSS figures refer to the average size of rice-growing farms.
Table 4—Distribution of households by farm size and by region
Red North South Central 
Farm size Northern River Central Central High- South- Mekong
in hectares Viet Nam Uplands Delta Coast Coast lands east Delta
(percent)
No land 1.2 0.9 0.8 2.3 1.4 0.8 1.7 0.7
Less than 0.2 27.0 25.5 45.5 30.7 28.0 10.2 9.5 6.2
0.2 to 0.5 44.0 49.1 50.4 54.7 46.2 32.3 27.5 25.7
0.5 to 1.0 16.2 17.2 3.2 11.1 17.6 32.5 29.7 30.7
1 to 3 10.5 6.9 0.1 1.1 6.4 22.9 27.9 32.5
More than 3 1.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.5 2.7 4.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: GSO 1995b, Table 2.107.
Note: Numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding.Delta has increased from less than 0.7 percent in 1994 to 5.7 percent in 1998 (Nguyen
1999).
Farms tend to be smaller in the north, particularly in the densely populated Red
River Delta where the average farm has just 0.22 hectares. In the south,intensive rice
cultivation began more recently, so it is less densely populated and the farms tend to
be larger. Rice accounts for a majority of the farm area in every region except the
Central Highlands (where it is 45 percent). The proportion of land allocated to rice
is more than 90 percent in the two deltas (Table 3).
Labor Use
The labor-intensity of rice production also reflects variation in population densities.
In the Red River Delta, rice cultivation takes more than 200 person-days per hectare
per season, while in the Mekong Delta the corresponding figure is 85 to 100 person-
days (Table 5). For the country as a whole, the average labor input is 116 to 134
person-days per hectare per season. This is roughly in the middle of the range found
in Asian countries (IRRI 1991).TABLE 5
Farmers in the Red River Delta use more labor in every phase of paddy produc-
tion. Land preparation in the Red River Delta is more labor-intensive because the use
of rented two-wheeled tractors is less common than in the south, though their use is
growing in both regions. Furthermore, most Red River Delta farmers use manure,
while very few do so in the Mekong Delta. Similarly, planting in the Red River Delta
uses four times as much labor per hectare as in the Mekong Delta, largely because
Red River farmers transplant rice seedlings rather than broadcasting seed. And har-
vesting in the Red River Delta is three times as labor intensive as in the Mekong be-
cause threshing is less mechanized (Pingali et al.1998).
Another difference between the two deltas is in the use of hired labor in rice pro-
duction. In the IFPRI farm survey, hired labor represented just 5 percent of total la-
bor use in the Red River Delta,but 33 to 39 percent in the Mekong River Delta (IFPRI
1996). Dac (1996, 49) in the Red River Delta and Dung (1994, 68) in the Mekong
Delta obtained similar findings.
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Table 5—Estimates of labor use in rice production
Pingali et al.  Dung  Dac  IFPRI 
Region 1998 1994 1996 1996
(days/hectare/season)
Red River Delta 246 — 238 252
Mekong River Delta 96 88 — 89/92
Viet Nam ——— 116/134
Sources: Pingali et al. 1998; Dung 1994; Dac 1996, 49; IFPRI 1996.
Note: The range given for the IFPRI figures refers to the estimates of labor use in different cropping seasons.Rapid economic growth in Viet Nam has implications for rice cultivation practices.
With rising opportunity costs in the Mekong Delta, farmers have increased the use of
direct seeding and herbicides,while reducing the application of manure. Some of these
practices will be adopted elsewhere as wage rates continue to rise (Pingali et al. 1998).
Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
After falling sharply in the late 1970s, chemical fertilizer use has increased dramat-
ically since 1980. Attempts to collectivize agriculture in the south contributed to a
reduction in fertilizer consumption from 420,000 tons of plant nutrients in 1977 to
155,000 tons in 1980, equivalent to about 22 kilograms per hectare of agricultural
land. With the adoption of the contract system, fertilizer use climbed to 376,000 tons
of nutrients (57 kilograms per hectare) in 1983 and to 544,000 tons (85 kilograms
per hectare) by 1990. Since 1990, fertilizer use has increased three-fold, reaching
1.5 million tons of nutrients (200 kilograms per hectare) in 1996 (data from the
FAOSTAT database of the FAO and GSO 1996b, 367). This growth is attributed to
the liberalization of fertilizer imports,5 falling urea/paddy price ratios,6 and increas-
ing cropping intensity of rice production.
Taking into account the fact that 75 to 80 percent of the fertilizer is used on paddy
and the area sown with paddy, farmers are applying around 170 to 182 kilograms of
plant nutrients per sown hectare of paddy. Although application levels are higher in
the deltas, the use of chemical fertilizer is not limited to these areas: according to the
VLSS, 92 percent of the rice farmers use chemical fertilizers. Table 6 shows some
typical fertilizer applications obtained from the IFPRI farm survey.TABLE 6
Organic fertilizers are used by more than two-thirds of the rice farmers in Viet
Nam, but there are wide regional differences. The proportion is more than 80 percent
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Table 6—Estimates of fertilizer use in rice cultivation in Viet Nam
Region Urea NPK SP Potash DAP
(kilograms/hectare)
Red River Delta 170–200 30–35 196–274 30 0
Mekong River Delta 131–165 88–91 5–34 6–14 40–100
Source: IFPRI 1996.
Notes: The range refers to averages for different seasons. NPK refers to compound fertillizer with nitrogen,phos-
phorous, and potassium. SP is superphosphate, and DAP is diammonium phosphate.
5 Fertilizer imports were subject to import quotas from 1992 to 1999, though it is not clear how binding these quotas
have been. Domestic production increased in the 1990s until the Asian financial crisis in 1997, when Indonesian urea
became more competitive.
6 According to unpublished data from the Ministry of Trade, the retail urea/paddy price ratio fell from 2.1 in 1991
to 1.1 in 1999.in the north and the South Central Coast but less than 30 percent in the Central High-
lands, Southeast, and the Mekong River Delta. The use of organic fertilizer is falling
due to the rising opportunity cost of labor and the falling urea/paddy price ratio.
Insecticides are used by most rice farmers, and more than 80 percent of rice farm-
ers in the two deltas own sprayers (Dung 1994, 34; Dac 1996, 32). Weeds are more
often controlled by physical methods rather than herbicides. Integrated pest man-
agement is a topic of growing importance in research and extension activities.
Cost of Production
The 1995 IFPRI survey of rice farmers collected information on the costs of pro-
duction, shown in Tables 7 and 8. The cash costs of production represent 34 to 42
percent of the gross revenue from rice production, depending on the season and re-
gion. The remainder (58 to 66 percent) is the returns to family labor and family-
owned land. Among the purchased inputs, fertilizer is the most important, account-
ing for 29 to 33 percent of cash costs, followed by seeds, machinery, and land
taxes.TABLES 7 AND 8
Table 8 reveals some regional differences in the composition of production costs.
The share of cash expenses allocated to hired labor and machinery expenses is al-
most twice as high in the Mekong Delta as in the Red River Delta, reflecting differ-
ences in cultivation methods discussed above. But rice farmers in the Red River Delta
allocate a larger share of cash expenses to animal traction, cooperative fees, and
irrigation.
Sources of Rice Production Growth
This section examines the patterns of growth in rice production by decomposing it
along several dimensions. First, the contributions of yield, area, and cropping inten-
sity to overall growth are considered. Next, the regional decomposition of rice pro-
duction growth is examined.
Yield, Area, and Crop Intensity
The growth in production can be decomposed into the growth from each of these
three factors plus an interaction term.
E Q   1
where Q is production, A is rice area, Y is yield, and I is cropping intensity. The pro-
portional contribution of each factor is calculated by dividing both sides of the equa-
tion by ∆Q/Q.












++ interaction, (1)Table 7—Cost of production for rice (winter-spring season)
Cost component Red River Delta Mekong River Delta National sample
(dong/ (percent of  (dong/ (percent of  (dong/ (percent of 
kilogram) cash cost) kilogram) cash cost) kilogram) cash cost)
Fertilizer 206 29 162 31 216 33
Pesticides 57 8 46 9 53 8
Seeds 92 13 67 13 90 14
Machinery 50 7 79 15 79 12
Hired labor 35 5 72 14 53 8
Animal traction 64 9 2 0 20 3
Cooperative fees 28 4 2 0 13 2
Irrigation 78 11 21 4 53 8
Land tax 92 13 41 8 66 10
Other 7 1 21 4 20 3
Total cash costs  709 100 516 100 662 100
per kilogram
Sources: IFPRI 1996, 308–309.
Table 8—Cost of production for rice (rainy season)
Cost component Red River Delta Mekong River Delta National sample
(dong/ (percent of  (dong/ (percent of  (dong/ (percent of 
kilogram) cash cost) kilogram) cash cost) kilogram) cash cost)
Fertilizer 202 28 225 29 238 31
Pesticides 57 8 54 7 54 7
Seeds 95 13 93 12 106 14
Machinery 57 8 178 23 109 14
Hired labor 36 5 124 16 47 6
Animal traction 71 10 0 0 39 5
Cooperative fees 28 4 0 0 23 3
Irrigation 71 10 8 1 54 7
Land tax 85 12 62 8 93 12
Other 7 1 31 4 16 2
Total cash costs 711 100 776 100 777 100
Farm gate price 2,070 1,866 2,044 
Source: IFPRI 1996, 313–314.
17paddy production during the period 1985–95. In spite of the 57 percent increase in
paddy production (4.6 percent annually), the area devoted to rice cultivation has ac-
tually declined slightly. All of the increase in national rice production is due to higher
yields and greater cropping intensity. Yields have grown by almost 33 percent (2.9
percent annually), while cropping intensity has risen by 22 percent (2.0 percent an-
nually). This implies that higher yields are responsible for 57 percent of the produc-
tion growth, while increased crop intensity accounts for 38 percent. The remainder
of the production growth is explained by the small decline in cultivated area and the
interaction effects.TABLE 9
Regional Patterns in Growth 
The production growth rate can be broken down by region using an equation similar
to the one used in the previous section. Table 10 indicates that two-thirds of the na-
tional growth over this period can be attributed to the Mekong River Delta. Not only
did it represent a large share of national paddy production in 1985 (43 percent), but
it grew more rapidly than any other region over the 10-year period (87 percent com-
pared with 35 percent for the other six regions). As a result, the Mekong River Delta
now accounts for half of national paddy production.TABLE 10
Improvements in irrigation and drainage in the Mekong River Delta have allowed
single rice-cropping systems during the rainy season to be converted to double rice-
cropping systems, often during the winter-spring and summer-autumn seasons. For
example, the areas allocated to floating rice, deep-water rice, and single-crop rainy
season rice have declined dramatically in favor of double or even triple rice-cropping
systems (Sub-NIAPP 1995).
In the Red River Delta and the North Central Coast, the pattern is quite different.
The sown area of rice declined in these regions, so the entire increase in production
in these two regions was the result of rising yield. Yield grew close to 50 percent over
the 10 years in each of these regions,the highest growth in yield in the country. There
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Table 9—Sources of growth in national rice production, 1985–95
Percent Percent
Level change contribution
Component 1985 1995 1985–95 of each factor
Rice area (1,000 hectares) 4,297 4,204 -2.2 -3.8
Cropping intensity (ratio) 1.32 1.61 22.0 38.4
Yield (tons/hectare/crop) 2.78 3.69 32.7 57.2
Interaction —— 4.7 8.3
Production (1,000 tons) 15,874 24,964 57.3 100.0
Source: GSO 1996b.
Note: Yield and production figures refer to tons of unmilled rice.is little room for area expansion because of the high population density and little
scope for further increasing already high cropping-intensity ratios.
Potential for Future Growth 
In the Red River Delta, the potential for area expansion is very limited. Not only is
agricultural land around Hanoi and Haiphong being absorbed for urban and indus-
trial development, but an increasing share of the land is being allocated to vegetables
and other crops as farmers diversify production to meet the demand from urban con-
sumers (Sub-NIAPP 1995, 39). Thus, in the Red River Delta, any increase in paddy
production will probably depend on improving yields rather than area expansion or
intensification.
In the Mekong River Delta, the conversion of fallow land into land for paddy pro-
duction in the provinces of Long An and Kien Giang would increase the sown paddy
area by 232,000 hectares (Sub-NIAPP 1995). In addition, cropping intensity on ex-
isting rice land could be increased, largely through investment in flood control and
drainage on the southern coast,where dry-season salinity is a problem. The combined
effect would be to increase sown paddy area by 500,000 hectares,representing 7 per-
cent of national sown area.
The potential for yield increases is more difficult to estimate. Average yields have
grown 2.8 percent since 1985, reaching 4 tons per hectare in 1999. Historical rates
of yield growth, however, may not be sustainable. Among the developing countries
in Asia, rice yields grew just 1.3 percent annually over the same period, suggesting
that part of Viet Nam’s yield growth represents a one-time response to decollec-
tivization and market liberalization. Viet Nam may be following the pattern of China,
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Table 10—Sources of growth in rice production by region, 1985–95
Contribution 
Contribution to regional growth in rice production of region to 
Cropping national
Region Rice area intensity Yield Interaction growth
(percent)
Northern Uplands 20.3 6.3 67.0 6.4 6.1
Red River Delta -16.3 15.7 102.8 -2.2 16.8
North Central Coast -16.7 9.0 112.3 -4.6 7.0
South Central Coast -87.9 149.5 47.7 -9.3 1.5
Central Highlands -29.8 74.3 55.5 -0.1 0.9
Southeast 14.0 66.9 14.1 4.7 1.9
Mekong River Delta -1.3 49.9 36.7 14.7 65.7
Viet Nam -3.8 38.4 57.2 8.3 100.0
Source: Calculated based on data from GSO 1996b.Table 11—Rice yields and yield growth in Viet Nam, China, and Asia
Developing
Year Asia China Viet Nam
Rice yield (metric tons of paddy/hectare)
1965 1.99 2.98 1.90
1970 2.27 3.29 2.06
1975 2.41 3.51 2.17
1980 2.74 4.24 2.12
1985 3.27 5.31 2.78
1990 3.56 5.61 3.17
1995 3.74 6.02 3.67
1996 3.87 6.33 3.98
Annual yield growth (percent)
1965–1975 1.9% 1.7% 1.3%
1975–1985 3.1% 4.2% 2.5%
1985–1999 1.3% 1.4% 2.8%
Source: FAO Agrostat database (http://apps.fao.org/).
Note: Yields are three-year averages centered on the indicated year. Growth rates are based on these three-year
averages.





















Source: FAOSTAT database of the FAO.
20which began liberalization earlier. In China, annual yield growth was more than 4
percent during 1975–85, but has since slowed to 1.4 percent (see Table 11).TABLE 11
Pingali et al. (1998) argue that further increases in Vietnamese yields may be dif-
ficult to achieve. For example, fertilizer use expanded rapidly over the 1980s in re-
sponse to market liberalization, but application rates in the two main deltas are now
similar to those in other irrigated regions of Asia. Furthermore, the high yields de-
pend on labor-intensive cultivation methods that farmers may not be willing to con-
tinue as wage rates rise. Although the industrialized and newly industrialized coun-
tries obtain yields of 5.7 to 6.9 tons per hectare,the only developing countries in Asia
with higher yields than Viet Nam are China, with 6.1 tons per hectare, and Indone-
sia, with 4.5 tons per hectare (Table 12). These two countries have much larger ar-
eas under irrigation: 93 and 72 percent, respectively, compared to around 56 percent
in Viet Nam (Pingali, Hossain, and Gerpacio 1997, 21). But the average yield in
China is still 20 percent higher than in the Red River Delta, which is almost entirely
irrigated.TABLE 12
To summarize, there is little scope for expanding sown paddy area significantly
so expansion in paddy production will increasingly depend on yield improvements.
Although yield growth has been relatively strong over the last 14 years, it seems
likely that this is part of a one-time response to liberalization and improved incen-
tives. If this is true, yield growth in Viet Nam will probably decline toward the yield
growth rate of other developing countries in Asia.
21T
he Vietnamese marketing system handles an impressive volume of rice:in 1997
about 16 million tons of milled rice were produced, of which 7 to 8 million tons
were marketed,passing through the hands of assemblers,millers,wholesalers,trans-
porters, and retailers. At least 2 million tons were shipped from surplus to deficit re-
gions within Viet Nam,and more than 3 million tons were exported. On the one hand,
the size of the marketing system is not surprising given the importance of rice as a
source of income for farm households, as a staple food, and as a major export. On
the other hand, the complexity and sophistication of the marketing system may be
somewhat unexpected given that participation in trading activities was suppressed,
with varying degrees of harshness, by the government before the doi moi policy was
introduced in 1986.
The objectives of this chapter are twofold. First, the structure and operation of the
“new” rice marketing system in Viet Nam is described, following the various mar-
keting channels that bring the product from farmer to consumer and identifying some
of the characteristics of the main participants in the marketing system. Second, the
performance of the rice marketing system is assessed. Several types of marketing
margins are examined under the assumption that margins will decline if markets be-
come more competitive and traders become more efficient. Prices are analyzed to
study changes in the co-movement of prices across markets within Viet Nam. Finally,
evidence is presented showing that the rice export quota has been binding, lowering
the domestic price of rice, and that internal restrictions limit the flow of rice from
south to north, widening the gap in rice prices between these two regions.
Structure of Rice Markets
This section describes the channels by which rice is marketed in Viet Nam and the
characteristics of the main participants in this process. It covers farm-level market-
ing, the milling sector, wholesale marketing, domestic retail marketing, and rice ex-
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CHAPTER 3
Structure and Performance 
of Rice Marketsports. Given its importance in overall rice markets, the Mekong River Delta’s mar-
keting system is discussed in more detail than the other regions.
Farm-Level Marketing
Data from the 1992–93 VLSS indicate that 84 percent of the rural households in Viet
Nam grow rice and 43 percent of rural households sell rice or paddy (see Table 13).
Thus, half of the Vietnamese rice farmers sell some of their harvest. The high pro-
portion of surplus rice farmers is a reflection of the relatively equitable distribution
of land and the fact that Viet Nam is a rice exporter. Furthermore, the proportion of
surplus rice farmers is probably even higher than these figures suggest because ex-
ports have risen from 2.5 million tons when the survey was carried out to 4.5 million
tons in 1999.TABLE 13
The proportion of surplus rice farmers is highest in the Mekong Delta, where
three-quarters of the rice farmers sell part of their output. The proportion is more than
50 percent in the Red River Delta and the Southeast, but less than 40 percent in the
other regions.
Interestingly, high-income rice farmers are only slightly more likely to generate a
marketable surplus than low-income rice farmers (Table 14). Because poor rural
households are more likely to grow rice than rich households, the proportion of all
rural households that sell rice is actually higher among the poor than the rich. This
has implications for the impact of rice policy on the poor,as discussed in Chapter 5.TABLE
14The proportion of rice production that is marketed varies widely across regions, as
shown by the results from the VLSS and the IFPRI survey in Table 15. More than
two-thirds of the paddy harvested in the Mekong Delta is sold. The Southeast is also
highly commercialized. The two surveys show sharply different estimates of the
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Table 13—Proportion of rural households growing and selling rice by region
Proportion of rural Proportion of rural
households Proportion of rice households
Region growing rice farmers selling rice selling rice
(percent)
Northern Uplands 94.1 33.6 31.6
Red River Delta 95.0 60.4 57.3
North Central Coast 88.0 40.8 35.9
South Central Coast 82.4 33.3 27.4
Central Highlands 80.9 14.7 11.9
Southeast 57.4 58.5 33.6
Mekong River Delta 73.9 75.5 55.8
Viet Nam 84.5 50.7 42.8
Source: Calculated based on data from the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey, 1992–93.Table 14—Proportion of rural households growing and selling rice by 
expenditure category
Proportion of rural Proportion of rural 
Expenditure category households Proportion of rice households
by quintile growing rice farmers selling rice selling rice
(percent)
Poorest 91.2 50.1 45.7
2 87.3 46.1 40.2
3 85.6 51.0 43.7
4 82.8 53.4 44.2
Richest 69.5 56.2 39.1
Viet Nam 84.5 50.7 42.8
Source: Calculated from the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey, 1992–93.
Note: Expenditure refers to per capita consumption expenditure (including the value of home-produced food).
Table 15—Rice production per agricultural household, 1995
Rice Marketed surplus of
production/ rice farmers
Paddy Agricultural agricultural VLSS IFPRI
production households household 1992/93 1995/96
Region (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(thousand (thousand of  (kilograms) (rice sales as percent
metric tons) households) of production)
Northern Uplands 2,254 1,956 640 19.3 12.0
Red River Delta 4,623 2,647 971 30.3 62.0
North Central Coast 2,141 1,583 752 29.1 33.0
South Central Coast 1,749 1,033 941 24.2 37.0
Central Highlands 429 436 547 10.5 45.0
Southeast 935 591 879 52.5 55.0
Mekong River Delta 12,832 2,297 3,105 65.6 72.0
Viet Nam 24,963 10,543 1,316 43.2 64.0
Sources: Columns (1) and (2) from GSO 1996b, 24, 66. Column (3) calculated assuming 0.65 conversion factor
from paddy to rice and 0.855 conversion from rice production to rice available for human consumption.
Column (4) calculated from 1992–93 Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) data. Column (5) cal-
culated from IFPRI survey of rice farmers (see IFPRI 1996, 59).
Notes: VLSS data probably understate 1995 market surplus ratios because paddy output grew 14 percent be-
tween 1992–93 when the survey was carried out and 1995. The IFPRI data probably overstate current 
market surplus ratios because the sample was focused on specialized rice farmers who tend to be larger 
than average.
24marketed surplus for the Red River Delta: 30 percent versus 62 percent. This may be
the result of expansion in the market surplus between the two surveys, a period dur-
ing which the new land law was implemented in the Delta, giving farmers stronger
incentives to produce for the market. Alternatively, it may reflect the fact that the
IFPRI survey focused on specialized rice farmers who tend to be somewhat larger
than average. Both surveys agree,however,that the other regions are much less com-
mercialized,particularly the mountainous areas in the Northern Uplands and the Cen-
tral Highlands. In these areas, rice production is mostly for home consumption. TABLE 15
Who buys the paddy from farmers? According to the 1995 IFPRI survey of rice
farmers, private assemblers account for more than 95 percent of paddy purchases
from farmers in every region of the country. This finding contradicts the conventional
wisdom in Viet Nam that the SOEs are active at the farm level. Assemblers tend to
be relatively young, and slightly more than half are women (Table 16). They almost
always operate in a relatively small area, buying from farmers within a distance of
10 kilometers. This allows assemblers to acquire and use a knowledge of the crop-
ping patterns and marketing history of local farmers. The scale of operation, how-
ever,is quite small (see Table 17). In the northern and central regions,assemblers use
bicycles and “cyclos” (three-wheeled vehicles, either motorized or pedal-operated)
to collect the paddy and handle 30 to 100 tons per year. In the south, they use carts
and boats, allowing them to move 200 to 1,000 tons per year (IFPRI 1996, 104–
125).TABLE 16TABLE 17
In the Mekong Delta, assemblers generally sell paddy to medium- and large-scale
millers. In contrast, assemblers in other regions tend to have the paddy milled and
sell processed rice to wholesalers. As shown in Figure 2, marketing channels are nu-
merous because assemblers also sell to wholesalers, retailers, and SOEs. FIGURE 2
Milling Sector
The rice milling sector is composed of private and state-owned rice mills with a wide
range of capacities, as shown in Table 18. Small mills (those having a capacity of
less than 1 ton per day) are the most numerous and widespread in Viet Nam. They
are almost always privately owned and are operated by just one or two workers. Fre-
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Table 16—Characteristics of traders
Percentage of
Years of time devoted to Percentage who
Traders experience rice trade Age are female
Assembler 7.69 92 35 53
Wholesaler 7.58 78 38 71
Retailer 7.55 89 39 80
Source: IFPRI 1996.26
Table 18—Characteristics of millers
Starting Tenure of Number of
year of current Milling Polishing Storage permanent
Type of miller operation management capacity capacity capacity workers
(metric tons)
Small 1991 1991 0.7 0.0 7.6 1.6
Medium 1987 1988 5.9 0.0 123.9 3.5
Large 1985 1988 24.1 0.0 476.5 7.2
Miller/polisher 1986 1987 34.2 38.0 5,650.0 36.0
Polisher 1991 1992 0.0 7.5 2,055.6 23.6
Source: IFPRI 1996.
quently, these mills process paddy on a contract basis for farmers to meet their own
consumption needs. Medium-sized mills, processing 1 to 10 tons per day, generally
employ 3 to 5 workers. Large mills, defined as those that can process more than 10
tons per day,are generally operated by 5 to 10 workers. These mills are fewer in num-
ber and are concentrated in the Mekong River Delta and the Southeast. Rice destined
for export is often polished, either by millers or specialized polishers. These mills
are large and are found almost exclusively in the south. TABLE 18
In the Mekong Delta, the most common pattern is for medium and large millers
to buy paddy from assemblers, process it, and sell rice to wholesalers and SOEs. In
the center and north,paddy is more often processed by small and medium-sized mills
on a contract basis, either by farmers for their own use or by assemblers for sale to
wholesalers (Figure 2).
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Figure 2—Rice marketing channels in the Mekong River Delta
Sources: Production data from GSO (1996) for 1995 crop year.  Proportions sold to each marketing agent based
on data from 1995-96 IFPRI survey.
Notes: All figures in milled rice equivalent.  Thickness of arrows is proportional to volume.  Flow of 0.2 mil-
lion tons from assemblers to other regions is excluded.  All tons are metric tons.Wholesale Marketing
Wholesalers are the main intermediaries between other categories of traders (as-
semblers and retailers) and millers and SOEs. They tend to be more specialized in
rice trade than assemblers and retailers, and they operate on a much larger scale. Ac-
cording to the IFPRI survey, wholesalers in the north and center handle 400 to 700
tons per year and use rented trucks to move their goods. Those in the Mekong River
Delta move an average of 1,000 tons per year, using their own boats. Wholesalers in
the urbanized Southeast are the largest, handling close to 3,000 tons per year on av-
erage. In addition, their storage capacity and rice stocks are much larger than those
of assemblers and retailers (Table 19). In the north, wholesalers are predominantly
men, while in the south the majority are women.TABLE 19
In the IFPRI survey, wholesalers frequently reported buying rice from and selling
rice to other wholesalers. Since the average distance of wholesaler transactions is
larger than that of other market participants, this presumably involves sales from a
rural wholesaler to an urban one or between wholesalers located in different
provinces. Wholesalers also supply retail traders.
SOEs play an important role in wholesale trade. They include regional food com-
panies (VINAFOOD I in the north and VINAFOOD II in the south) and provincial
food companies. The SOEs operate on a much larger scale than private traders, in
terms of volume of trade,size of assets,and storage facilities (Tables 17 and 19). They
tend to dominate long-distance internal trade (from south to north), and they have a
legal monopoly on rice exports.7 As a result, the SOEs are major buyers in the
Mekong River Delta and important suppliers of rice to wholesalers in the food-deficit
regions (Figure 2).
Domestic Retail Marketing 
Rice retailers generally buy rice from wholesalers and transport it to their establish-
ment using bicycles or cyclos. About 80 percent of the rice retailers are women, the
proportion being highest in the Mekong Delta (Table 16). In rural areas, they work
from a stall in the market place, while in urban areas they may have their own shops.
Retailers usually handle 40 to 80 tons per year, although the average is higher in the
urbanized Southeast. Their storage capacity is minimal (Table 19).
Export Marketing
Although SOEs have a legal monopoly on rice exports, in order to enforce the rice
export quotas, they are required to obtain an export permit that specifies the quantity
they can export. Between 10 and 40 SOEs have been issued export permits in recent
28
7 In 1998, the government established criteria for private traders to be eligible to export rice (Decision 12/TTg of Jan-
uary 1998). In 1999, several private companies received quotas, though for only 4 percent of the total rice exports. 29
Table 19—Rice storage patterns by type of market participant
Market participant Capacity Rice stock Holding period
(metric tons) (days)
Retailer 5.6 1.7 5.8
Wholesaler 117.3 22.3 5.9
Assembler 6.1 0.2 1.3
Small miller 17.9 1.9 2.3
Polisher 1,930.9 480.3 15.6
State-owned enterprises 21,734.3 2,978.5 23.2
Source: IFPRI 1996.
Table 20—Vietnamese rice exports and share of world exports
Vietnamese
World rice Vietnamese share in
Year exports rice exports world exports
(million metric tons) (percent)
1989 15.2 1.4 9.3
1990 12.5 1.6 13.0
1991 13.2 1.0 7.9
1992 16.1 1.9 12.1
1993 16.8 1.7 10.2
1994 18.0 2.0 11.0
1995 22.5 2.0a 8.8
1996 20.4 3.0 17.2
1997 20.9 3.6 17.1
1998 28.6 3.8 13.3
Source: FAOSTAT database of the FAO.
a Official statistics for 1995 give 2.0 million metric tons, but it is widely believed that 0.5 million metric tons were
exported “informally” to China that year.
years. The volume of rice exported was around 2 million tons from 1989 to 1995, al-
though it is thought that there were significant “informal” exports to China in 1995
(Table 20). The export quota and the system of administrative allocation of the per-
mits have been the subject of considerable debate in Viet Nam, as will be discussed
later in this chapter and in Chapter 6. TABLE 20
Most export-oriented SOEs buy rice rather than paddy, though they may further
mill it or polish it before exporting. In some cases, the SOE merely acts as the “of-
ficial” exporter for a deal arranged between a private miller and a foreign buyer.Performance of the Rice Marketing System
This section examines the performance of rice markets along several dimensions.
First, the trends in the level and variability of rice prices in Viet Nam are reviewed.
Second, changes in rice marketing margins and in the degree of spatial integration
of rice markets are assessed. Third, the marketing costs and profitability of rice mar-
keting activities are examined. Finally, evidence is presented of policy restrictions
on rice trade by combining information on price differences and marketing costs. The
analysis is mostly based on time-series data on prices from the General Statistical
Office and primary data obtained from the IFPRI surveys in 1995–96.
Trends in Rice Prices
The trends in paddy and rice prices during the period 1989–96 are shown in Table
21. While the average annual increase in rice prices in the first two years of this pe-
riod (1989–91) was 58 percent, the annual increase fell to under 10 percent for the
remaining period (1991–96), reflecting the fall in inflation since 1991. The incen-
tives for paddy production and consumption depend,however,not on nominal prices,
but on the prices of paddy and rice relative to other goods. Since 1989 both paddy
and rice prices have risen more slowly than the index of retail prices. The real price
of paddy has fallen 4.3 percent per year, while the real price of rice has declined 3.2
percent (Table 21). Monthly data presented in Figure 3 show that the decline occurred
between mid-1990 and mid-1992. This trend benefits consumers,but the implications
for farm income are more difficult to assess. The change in farm income depends on
the path of prices, production, and cost of production. As mentioned, real paddy
prices have declined by 3.2 percent per year, but production has increased at an an-
nual rate of 5.6 percent over the same period. Reliable trends on cost of production
are not available, but yields have grown more than 2.5 percent per year over this pe-
riod. This suggests that higher productivity has partly compensated for the decline
in real prices. Although the net effect on farmers is not clear, the gains to farmers
have been lower than they would have been under a more open trade system (as will
be shown in Chapter 6). The rice export quota has imposed an implicit tax on Viet-
namese rice farmers that has prevented domestic rice prices from reaching parity with
export prices.TABLE 21
f i g u r e   3
Variability in Rice Prices 
Inflation and related macroeconomic instability in the late 1980s caused rice prices to
be quite volatile. As macroeconomic stability returned in the early 1990s, the volatil-
ity of rice prices decreased (Figure 4). The coefficient of variation of monthly rice prices
was 0.05 during 1991–95, less than one-fifth of the value during 1986–90.FIGURES 4 AND 5
Another source of variability in rice prices is seasonality. At the aggregate level,
seasonality is not very pronounced. Over the period 1991–96 the range between sea-
sonal peak and trough was about 10 percent (Figure 5). The seasonal variation is
30Table 21—Trends in paddy and rice prices
Farm gate Retail rice Index retail Deflated Deflated
Year paddy price price price paddy price rice price
(dong/kilogram) (1989 = 1.0) (1989 dong/kilogram)
1989 497 771 1.0 497 771
1990 833 1,279 1.4 605 930
1991 1,404 1,924 2.5 559 765
1992 1,472 2,020 3.5 426 585
1993 1,445 2,062 3.7 389 556
1994 1,523 2,179 4.1 375 536
1995 1,939 2,761 4.7 411 585
1996 1,822 3,057 5.0 366 614
Annual growth rate,
1989–1996 (percent) 20.4 21.8 25.8 -4.3 -3.2
Source: Monthly District Prices, General Statistical Office; Index Retail Price, Government Price Committee.






















Figure 3—Real prices of paddy and rice
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Figure 4—Coefficient of variation of monthly paddy prices
Figure 5—Seasonal variation in paddy prices
Source: Calculated from unpublished price data from the General Statistical Office.
Source: Calculated from unpublished data from the General Statistical Office.somewhat lower in the south (8 percent) than in the north (12 percent). The aggre-
gate picture,however,hides considerable variation at the district level,where it is pos-
sible to have seasonal variation of 30 percent.
Seasonality of price is a reflection of seasonality of production, with prices show-
ing a tendency to decline after harvest and to increase before harvest. The smaller
seasonal price variation in the south presumably occurs because the harvest is less
seasonally concentrated (see Table 2), and the export market prevents Mekong har-
vest prices from falling below a certain level.
Trends in Marketing 
Marketing margins reflect both the cost of marketing and the profits of marketing
agents. Competitive pressure as a result of liberalization of agricultural markets since
1986 can be expected to reduce profits and perhaps costs, resulting in lower market-
ing margins. This section examines the trends in paddy-rice wholesale price margins,
farmer-retail margins,and north-south margins during 1986–95. The analysis shows
that very little, if anything, has happened to reduce the price differentials between
stages of processing and marketing or across regions.
The paddy-rice price margin reflects the costs and profits in the rice milling sec-
tor. Rice prices are 73 to 75 percent above paddy prices in the same location. Re-
gression analysis of the absolute price difference as a function of time show no sta-
tistically significant trend over the period 1986–95 (Table 22).TABLE 22
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Table 22—Trends in different types of margins
Average
Type of margin margin Trend
(percent)
Margin between rice prices in the north and the south 30 none
Margin between wholesale rice and paddy price in
North 73 none
South 75 none
Margin between wholesale paddy price and farm price in
North 5 none
South 4 none
Margin between retail rice price and wholesale price in
North 8 negligible
South 9 negligible
Source: Based on unpublished data from the General Statistical Office.
Notes: The average margin is the difference between the two relevant prices as a percentage of the lower price.
The trend is computed by testing the hypothesis H1: ß < 0 in the regression equation abs(P1t – P2t) = 
a + ß t + εtwhere P1t, P2tare the relevant prices at time t.The farm-wholesale and wholesale-retail rice price margins reflect changes in the
costs and profits of rice trading. Wholesale rice prices are 4 to 5 percent above farm
gate rice prices and retail prices are 8 to 9 percent above wholesale prices. Regres-
sion analysis again shows no statistically significant trend in the absolute price
differences.
Finally, the north-south wholesale rice price margin reflects the costs and profits
of transportation and marketing from south to north, given that the deficit regions in
the north are supplied annually with part of the surplus from the Mekong Delta.
Prices in the north are,on average,30 percent higher than in the south,but again there
is no trend in the price difference over time. Table 23 shows a substantial annual vari-
ation in this margin. In addition, as discussed later in this chapter, the north-south
margin is larger than would be expected based on marketing and transportation costs.
This appears to be the result of policies that restrict interregional trade.TABLE 23
Analysis of Market Integration
The idea behind the analysis of market integration is to study the degree of co-move-
ment of prices in spatially separated markets. A high degree of market integration
suggests that the markets are “connected,” but this connection is neither necessary
nor sufficient for market efficiency. As is well known, efficient markets will be un-
integrated if the price difference (in the absence of trade) is less than the cost of trans-
portation between the markets or if flows move in different directions at different
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Table 23—Wholesale prices of rice in different regions
Average wholesale price Margin relative to price in south
Year North Center South North Center
(dong/kilogram) (percent)
1986 20 20 21 -4.8 -4.8
1987 142 125 124 14.5 0.8
1988 528 441 373 41.6 18.2
1989 779 703 640 21.7 9.8
1990 1,335 1,231 929 43.7 32.5
1991 2,081 1,745 1,499 38.8 16.4
1992 2,111 1,789 1,721 22.7 4.0
1993 2,100 1,840 1,833 14.6 0.4
1994 2,174 2,034 1,818 19.6 11.9
1995 2,917 2,503 2,208 32.1 13.4
1996 3,462 2,919 2,287 51.4 27.6
Source: Based on unpublished data from the General Statistical Office.times. Alternatively, markets may be highly integrated even if market power or pol-
icy restrictions make the price differences exceed transportation costs (Harriss 1979;
Baulch 1997). Nonetheless,the measures of price integration show the degree of con-
nectedness of markets, and changes in the degree of integration should reflect
changes in efficiency or transportation costs or both.
There are various approaches to measuring market integration: correlation analy-
sis, cointegration analysis, and dynamic multiplier analysis (see Appendix 1, which
discusses the various methods). These methods are applied to monthly data on whole-
sale rice prices in 21 markets covering the period 1986–95. Each analysis is carried
out separately for two periods, 1986–90 and 1991–95, to identify changes in the de-
gree of market integration.
The simplest approach to market integration is to calculate the correlation coeffi-
cient for prices in each pair of markets. As shown in Table 24, the average correla-
tion among the 410 market pairs is very high: 0.98 during 1986–90 and 0.77 during
1991–95. This is not surprising, given that all prices were affected by inflation and
seasonal patterns. The closer correlation of prices in 1986–90 is due to the higher
rate of inflation in that period. TABLE 24
The effect of inflation and seasonal patterns can be removed by analyzing the cor-
relation of price differences from one month to the next. This not only reduces the
level of correlation substantially,but the degree of correlation increases slightly from
the first period to the second (Table 24) Thus, correlation analysis suggests that
wholesale rice prices move in line with general inflation, and that price changes are
only weakly related among spatially separated markets.
While correlation analysis measures the co-movement of prices in the same
month, cointegration analysis takes into account the possible lagged effect of prices
in one market on prices in the other and controls for autocorrelation of prices. The
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Table 24—Changes in market integration over time
Type of analysis Measures of market integration 1986–90 1991–95
Correlation  Average correlation of price  0.98 0.77
analysis levels across market pairs
Average correlation of price  0.40 0.43
changes across market pairs
Co-integration  Percentage of cointegrated  29% 39%
analysis market pairs
Percentage of segmented  34% 20%
market pairs
Dynamic multiplier Magnitude of price adjustment 0.44 0.54
analysis Speed of price adjustment 5.15 months 5.34 months
Source: Calculated from unpublished data from General Statistical Office on monthly wholesale rice prices for
1986–95 for 21 districts.analysis of cointegration coefficients shows that the proportion of segmented8 mar-
ket links fell from 34 percent in 1986–90 to 20 percent in 1991–95, while the pro-
portion of cointegrated links rose from 29 to 39 percent between the two periods
(Table 24). This is an indication that the market reforms have improved long-term
relations among various markets.
The analysis of dynamic multipliers provides insight into the extent of integration,
by measuring the strength and the speed of the price adjustment process. The analy-
sis shows that the magnitude of the long-term multipliers rose from 0.44 in 1986–
90 to 0.54 in 1991–95. The adjustment period is somewhat longer in the second pe-
riod (5.34 months) than in the first (5.15 months), though the difference is small (see
Table 24). International comparison shows that the very low degree of spatial mar-
ket integration of Viet Nam is similar to that of Malawi, with its poor rural infra-
structure, and to that of Pakistan and Egypt, countries that impose restrictions on in-
ternal trade (Table 25).TABLE 25
In summary, markets are still poorly integrated in Viet Nam even though there has
been a slight improvement over the past decade. Notwithstanding active private sector
involvement in rice marketing, the local nature of domestic trade makes it difficult to
use arbitrage to minimize the price differentials across spatially separated markets.
Marketing Costs and Profitability
Price incentives,together with marketing costs,affect the profits of marketing agents
and thus their procurement and selling decisions. One of the objectives of analyzing
costs is to understand the relative efficiency of various marketing agents. The first
conclusion emerging from this analysis is that private sector costs are considerably
lower than those of SOEs. Unit costs of SOEs in the Mekong River Delta and the
Red River Delta range from 4 to 16 times the corresponding costs in the private sec-
tor (Table 26). The inefficiency of SOEs is not surprising given the rigidities of em-
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Table 25—Comparative dynamic indicators of market integration
Egypt Bangladesh Malawi Pakistan Viet Nam
Indicator wheat rice maize wheat rice
Long-term 0.35 0.73 0.49 0.47 0.54
multiplier
Speed of  3.53 2.6 5.7 3.39 5.15
adjustment
Source: Computations based on General Statistical Office data and Goletti 1994.
8 Two markets are segmented if there is no long-term relation with each other. In other words two segmented mar-
kets are not cointegrated (also see Appendix 1).ployment in the state sector, the lower incentives of salaried managers, and the use
of large-scale but often inappropriate equipment. Even so, the extent of the differ-
ence is surprising.TABLE 26
A second conclusion emerging from this analysis is that the margins of market-
ing agents in the Red River Delta are lower than those in the Mekong River Delta
(Table 27). This is true whether the margin is defined in absolute terms (US$53 ver-
sus US$88 per ton) or as a percentage of the retail price (17 percent versus 29 per-
cent). The higher marketing costs in the Mekong River Delta are a reflection of a
more complex marketing system than in the north, characterized by higher trans-
portation, labor, and depreciation costs.TABLE 27
This does not imply, however, that the returns to farmers are lower in the Mekong
than in other regions, nor that the prices paid by consumers are higher. The returns
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Table 26—Unit operating costs
Large miller State-owned
Region Wholesaler Medium miller and polisher enterprise
(US$/metric ton)
Red River Delta 7.85 3.26 8.24 55.26
Mekong River Delta 11.67 6.29 7.29 42.99
Viet Nam 9.38 5.88 10.63 40.71
Source: IFPRI 1996.
Table 27—Composition of retail price
Item Red River Delta Mekong River Delta
(US$/ (percent of  (US$/ (percent of 
metric ton) retail price) metric ton) retail price)
Farmers
Unit cost 206 65 120 40
Unit profit 57 18 93 31
Farm gate price 263 83 213 71
Market agents
Unit cost 19 6 33 11
Unit profit 34 11 55 18
Margin 53 17 88 29
Retail price 316 100 301 100
Source: IFPRI 1996.
Note: “Profit” in this table refers to returns to labor and fixed factors such as land.to labor in the Mekong are higher than in other regions because yields are high and
farms are large by Vietnamese standards. Furthermore, because of the productivity
of rice production in the Mekong, consumers pay lower prices for rice in spite of the
somewhat higher marketing margin.
Restrictions on Internal Rice Trade
As a result of the deficit position in the north and the surplus in the south, prices in
the north are generally higher than prices in the south. In 1995, the wholesale rice
prices in the north and in the south were, on average, 2,917 dong9 per kilogram and
D2,208 per kilogram,respectively,implying a price differential of D709 per kilogram
or 32 percent of the southern price. As shown in Table 23, this is not an unusual sit-
uation: average yearly rice prices in the north were 15 to 39 percent higher than cor-
responding prices in the south during the period 1987–96.FIGURE 6
The IFPRI survey of traders collected data on the costs of transportation and mar-
keting between markets. According to these results, the cost of shipping rice from
the south to the north should be slightly less than D300 per kilogram. In other words,
only 42 percent of the north-south price difference can be explained by marketing
and transportation costs. This suggests that movement restrictions prevent spatial ar-
bitrage from bringing the price differences down to the cost of transportation and
marketing.
This hypothesis is supported by the results of the IFPRI trader survey in which
traders report restrictions on internal rice trade, particularly on long-distance trade.
Almost 60 percent of SOEs report restrictions on internal trade, followed by about
20 percent of miller-polishers, polishers, wholesalers, and assemblers; and less
than 10 percent of retailers and millers (Table 28). These patterns reflect the larger
volumes and the longer distances over which SOEs, large private traders, miller-
polishers, and polishers operate. Retailers and millers generally do not trade over
long distances so they do not experience restrictions on the movement of rice.TABLE 28
In part, these restrictions take the form of bureaucratic rigidities. As of late 1996,
the procedures to buy and transport rice from the south to the north resemble those
for trade with another country. At that time, SOEs in the north wishing to buy rice
from the south had to (1) apply for a license from the Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural Development, (2) register with the Market Control Department, (3) buy rice at
the place determined by VINAFOOD II, (4) register with local market control sec-
tions in the south, (5) register at the ports of departure and arrival, and (6) register
with local market control sections in the north. These complex procedures add to
costs and limit the effective stabilization of food markets in the country. The effect
of liberalizing internal rice trade on prices and income are analyzed in Chapter 5, us-
ing a simulation model of Vietnamese rice markets.
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9 The exchange rate between the dong (VND), the currency of Viet Nam, and the U.S. dollar was 11,032 VND per
U.S. dollar.39
Table 28—Traders, state-owned enterprises, and millers’reported
restrictions on the movement of goods
Percentage of Second most
marketing agents Most commonly commonly reported
Agent reporting restrictions reported restriction restriction
Retailers 1 Police Interprovince
Wholesalers 23 Interprovince Police
Assemblers 17 Interdistrict Interprovince
State-owned enterprises 57 Interprovince Police
Small millers 1 Interprovince Interdistrict
Medium millers 5 Interprovince Interdistrict
Large millers 5 Interprovince Interdistrict
Polishers 20 Police Interprovince
Polishers and millers 24 Interprovince Interdistrict
Source: IFPRI 1996.
Restrictions on Rice Exports
The policy restrictions on rice exports are more explicit. Since 1989 when Viet Nam
began exporting rice, the government has restricted the volume of rice exports
through the use of export licenses, even as international trade in other commodities
has been liberalized. Government officials argue that the quotas are necessary to en-
sure adequate domestic supplies and reduce price volatility. In order to control rice
exports, only a limited number of SOEs are allocated rice export quotas (the number
varies between 15 and 40).
An important question is whether the export quota has been binding. In other
words, are rice exports less than what they would be in the absence of the quota? The
intense political lobbying among SOEs and private companies to receive export
quota allocations would suggest that the quota is binding, but it would be useful to
quantify its effect.
According to trade theory, a binding export (import) quota will result in domestic
prices below (above) the relevant border price and have similar effects as an export
(import) tax. In 1995, the average wholesale price of rice in the Mekong River Delta
was D2,231 per kilogram or US$202 per ton, yet the average f.o.b. price of Viet-
namese rice exports was US$269 per ton. Thus, the export quota in 1995 was equiv-
alent to an export tax of roughly US$67 per ton or 25 percent of the border price. Table
29 reveals that 1995 was not an unusual year in terms of the divergence between do-
mestic and border prices. This indicates that the rice export quota was binding over
the period 1990–95 and equivalent to an export tax of 20 to 25 percent.TABLE 29
Looking toward the future,Viet Nam’s rice export policy may be affected by trade
agreements over the next 5 to 10 years. Viet Nam’s membership in the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and agreement to the ASEAN Free Trade Agree-
ment (AFTA) is not likely to impose restrictions on Vietnamese rice policy because
rice is considered too politically sensitive in most ASEAN countries. Although the
World Trade Organization, to which Viet Nam has applied for membership, prohibits
the use of export quotas, Dao (1999) argues that current rice policy could be retained
under Clause 2(a) of Article 11, which allows “temporary prohibition or restriction of
exports to prevent or reduce scarcity of grain, food, or other essential products.” On
the other hand,Anderson (1998) argues that “WTO members are likely to demand that
the quantitative restrictions on rice exports be at least converted to an export tax,” ex-
cept in times of shortage. Thus, WTO commitments highlight the importance of un-
derstanding the impact of rice export liberalization, a topic examined in Chapter 6.
Conclusions 
This brief description of the structure of the rice marketing system in Viet Nam sug-
gests that it has rapidly developed into a complex system without the central man-
agement that policymakers once thought necessary. Tens of thousands of traders
handle millions of tons of rice every year, channeling it from surplus farmers to ur-
ban consumers, rural rice-deficit areas, and exporters. Furthermore, the channels are
numerous and differ from one region to another. The role of the SOEs is minimal in
the rice marketing system except in the area of long-distance trade, where it domi-
nates, and exports, where it has a legal monopoly.10
Regarding the performance of the rice marketing system, macroeconomic stabi-
lization has reduced rice price volatility, but market liberalization does not seem to
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Table 29—Margin between domestic and border prices
Domestic price Border price Margin as Margin as
(wholesale price in  (f.o.b. export percentage of percentage of
Year the Mekong Delta) price) domestic price border price
(US$/metric ton) (percent)
1990 135 170 26.3 20.8
1991 164 226 38.2 27.6
1992 155 207 33.1 24.9
1993 159 203 28.1 21.9
1994 162 218 34.2 25.5
1995 202 269 33.2 24.9
Average 163 216 32.0 24.5
Source: Export and domestic prices from the General Statistical Office.
10 As mentioned earlier, private traders have been allocated export quotas starting in 1999, but they account for just
4 percent of rice exports.have had a noticeable effect on marketing margins between paddy and rice prices,
between farmer and retail prices, or between prices in the north and south. Spatial
market integration analysis indicates that the degree of market integration has in-
creased somewhat since the late 1980s, but it remains weak.
The performance of the marketing system is affected by two types of restrictions
on trade. First, restrictions on internal trade were in effect in 1995, as indicated by
the responses of traders in the 1995–96 IFPRI survey and by the large price differ-
ential between rice prices in the north and south. Second,the rice export quota is used
by the government to ensure adequate domestic supplies. A comparison of domestic
and border prices reveals that the quota was binding at least during 1990–95 and that
it was equivalent to an export tax of 20 to 25 percent. The implications of these poli-
cies and some alternatives are presented in Chapter 6.
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nformation on food and calorie consumption patterns is useful in the analysis of
rice policy for several reasons. First, the impact of rice policy on the welfare of
different households depends in part on the importance of rice in their budgets. Sec-
ond, in order to simulate the impact of policy changes on rice markets, information
is needed on the price and income elasticities of demand for rice and other foods.
Third, the relationship between income and rice consumption is critical for evaluat-
ing the sustainability of Vietnamese rice exports, especially given the constraints on
expanding rice production discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, even though rice is the
main food staple in Viet Nam, other foods contribute to total calorie consumption.
The effect of price changes on total calorie consumption is critical to evaluate the ef-
fects of policy on food security, particularly for the poorest.
This chapter first describes the trends in rice consumption over time. Then pat-
terns of rice consumption and purchases across regions and household types are ex-
amined; an econometric model of food demand in Viet Nam, of which rice is a part,
is estimated; and the effects of price and income changes on total calorie consump-
tion are evaluated.
Trends in Rice Consumption
The only data on Vietnamese rice consumption available for various years is ap-
parent rice consumption per capita, defined as net production minus net exports
divided by population.11 It is assumed that postharvest losses, seed, and feed ac-
count for 14.5 percent of production.12 The limitations of this measure of con-
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CHAPTER 4
Food Demand and 
Calorie Consumption
11 Production statistics, expressed in terms of paddy, are converted to milled rice equivalents using a conversion fac-
tor of 0.65. Trade statistics are already expressed in terms of milled rice.
12 This is based on an estimate by Le Don Dien (1995). This percentage is roughly consistent with data from the
1998 Viet Nam Living Standards Survey in which 12 percent of the rice harvest was used for seed, fed to animals,
or lost (GSO 1999, Table 5.2.6). In addition, the apparent consumption figures derived from this estimate are con-
sistent with survey-based estimates of per capita rice consumption (compare Tables 30 and 31).sumption are well known, but it should provide a rough indicator of trends in rice
consumption.13
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the south imported between 100,000 and
500,000 tons of rice per year. After the unification of Viet Nam in 1975, rice imports
practically disappeared,causing a sharp reduction in apparent consumption. This was
partly related to the military and economic withdrawal of the United States during
1973–75 and partly due to the emphasis placed on self-sufficiency by the socialist
government that took control of the south in 1975.
The five-year plan of 1976–81 called for a 40 percent increase in staple food pro-
duction. Nonetheless, attempts to collectivize agriculture in the south actually re-
sulted in lower output, with production and apparent consumption reaching a low
point of less than 110 kilograms per capita in 1978. With the relaxation of attempts
to collectivize the south, consumption recovered to about 125 kilograms in 1980–
81, but this was still far below the target.
In 1981, Instruction 100 allowed farmers to cultivate individual plots and sell
above-quota surpluses on the free market. These partial reforms raised production in
the next five years to about 170 kilograms per capita and consumption to around 150
kilograms per capita, bringing consumption back to its wartime level and production
above that level.
In 1988 and 1989, Instruction 10, which effectively decollectivized agricultural
production, combined with trade liberalization and devaluation, improved the in-
centives to produce and export rice (Pingali and Xuan 1992). Production per capita
rose fairly steadily from 173 kilograms in 1988 to 233 kilograms in 1997. This al-
lowed exports to expand, reaching 45 kilograms per capita in 1997.
In the first two years of rice exports (1989–90), the absolute increase in rice ex-
ports was greater than the absolute increase in rice production, resulting in lower ap-
parent consumption. Starting in 1991,however,apparent rice consumption rose from
around 146 kilograms to 154 kilograms per capita by 1997 in spite of the growing
exports. Overall, the expansion of rice exports since 1988 has not occurred through
the reduction of domestic consumption. Rather, increased production has allowed
dramatic expansion of exports combined with smaller increases in domestic per
capita rice consumption (Table 30).TABLE 30
It is interesting to note that apparent per capita rice consumption is relatively sta-
ble over the 1990s. Given that per capita gross domestic product increased at about
6 percent annually over this period, the implication is that the income elasticity of
rice demand is close to zero.14
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13 This measure of apparent consumption does not, however, take into account the level of stocks from one year to
the next. Changes in stocks tend to be positive in high-production years and negative in low-production years. Thus,
to the extent that changes in stocks are significant, actual consumption will be more stable over time than apparent
consumption. 
14 Real rice prices have been relatively stable since 1992 (see Figure 3) and the pace of urbanization is relatively
slow in Viet Nam, so these factors are not likely to have had much effect on demand trends over the 1990s.44
Table 30—Apparent rice consumption in Viet Nam, 1975–97
Paddy Rice production Net exports Apparent rice
Year production per capita of rice Population consumption
(million (kilograms (million (millions) (kilograms 
metric tons) per capita) metric tons) per capita)
1975 10.5 144 -0.3 47.6 130
1976 11.8 156 -0.1 49.2 137
1977 10.6 137 -0.2 50.4 121
1978 9.8 124 -0.1 51.4 107
1979 11.4 141 -0.1 52.5 122
1980 11.6 141 -0.2 53.7 124
1981 12.4 147 0.0 54.9 126
1982 14.4 167 -0.2 56.2 146
1983 14.7 167 0.0 57.4 143
1984 15.5 172 -0.2 58.7 151
1985 15.9 172 -0.3 59.9 152
1986 16.0 170 -0.4 61.1 151
1987 15.1 157 -0.2 62.5 138
1988 17.0 173 -0.1 63.7 150
1989 19.0 191 1.4 64.8 142
1990 19.2 189 1.6 66.2 137
1991 19.6 188 1.0 67.8 146
1992 21.6 202 1.9 69.4 145
1993 22.8 209 1.7 71.0 154
1994 23.5 211 2.0 72.5 153
1995 24.9 219 2.0 74.0 160
1996 26.5 228 3.0 75.5 155
1997 27.6 233 3.5 77.0 154
Source: For data until 1995, paddy production and population from Kim 1996, and net export data from the
FAOSTAT database of the FAO. For 1996 and 1997 data based on communication from the General Sta-
tistical Office. Rice production calculated from paddy production assuming 65 percent conversion. Ap-
parent consumption calculated from paddy production assuming 65 percent conversion and 14.5 percent
losses, seedand feed use.
Rice Consumption across Households
Rice consumption was measured at the household level by the Viet Nam Living
Standards Survey (VLSS) in 1992–93. The VLSS used a nationally representative
sample of 4,800 households scattered across 150 communes in 52 of the 54
provinces. The survey collected information on income,expenditure,housing,health,education, migration, agricultural production, and food consumption, among other
topics. The information presented in this section is based on a subsample of 4,513
households from the VLSS.15
According to the VLSS, rice is consumed by practically every household in Viet
Nam (99.9 percent). The data from the survey indicate that in 1992–93 average rice
consumption was 156 kilograms per capita. This figure corresponds fairly closely to
the per capita apparent consumption in 1992 and 1993 (Table 30).
Rice is by far the most important food item in Viet Nam. As shown in Table 31,
rice contributes 75 percent of the caloric intake of Vietnamese households and rep-
resents almost 30 percent of the value of consumption expenditure.16By contrast, the
three minor staples (maize, cassava, and sweet potatoes) together represent less than
8 percent of the value of consumption expenditure and less than 4 percent of the
caloric intake.TABLE 31
Rice consumption does vary, however, across household types, as shown in Table
31. Urban households consume about 127 kilograms of rice per capita,compared with
163 kilograms per capita in rural areas. Households headed by males consume some-
what more rice than households headed by females (157 to 151 kilograms per capita),
largely because female-headed households are more common in urban areas.
Regionally, rice consumption ranges from 131 kilograms per capita in the South-
east to close to 170 kilograms per capita in the Red River Delta. Part of these differ-
ences can be attributed to the effects of urbanization and income. The Southeast has
the highest average income and is the most urbanized of the seven regions.
Rice consumption also varies by income group, as shown in Table 31 and Figure
6. At low levels of income,17 rice is a normal good (rice consumption rises with in-
come). But beyond a certain level of income, however, rice consumption begins to
fall,making rice an inferior good. In this income range,additional income is not spent
on rice but rather on higher-value foods such as meat, eggs, and dairy products and
on nonfood items (see GSO 1994, 194).
The share of the budget allocated to rice falls from 47 percent in the poorest quin-
tile to just 12 percent in the richest. Similarly, the share of calories coming from rice
falls with higher incomes, but even in the richest quintile, rice contributes more than
half of the caloric intake.
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15 Households for which estimated caloric intake was below 1,000 kilocalories per person or above 3,500 kilocalo-
ries per person were excluded from the analysis, based on the idea that these figures reflect problems in the con-
sumption data.
16 Consumption expenditure is the total value of purchases for consumption, food produced and consumed within
the household, goods obtained through barter or gift, and the rental equivalent of consumer durables and housing.
17 Throughout the analysis of the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey, this study uses per capita consumption ex-
penditure as the main indicator of the well-being of households. It is easier than income to measure accurately and
more stable over time. Nonetheless, in the interest of simplicity, the term “income” is used in the text. Determinants of Food Demand
In this section,regression analysis is used to examine systematically the determinants
of the demand for food among Vietnamese households. The linear approximation of
the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) is used with an urban-expenditure inter-
action term to allow greater flexibility in demand patterns between urban and rural
households. Thus, the demand equation takes the following form:
E Q 2
where si is the budget share of food group i, pj is the price of food j, Z0 is a dummy
variable indicating urban households, x is the value of consumption expenditure per
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Table 31—Rice consumption by household type
Percentage of all Value of rice Calories
Household type households Rice consumption consumption from rice
(percent) (kilograms/person/ (percent of total  (percent of 
year) consumption total caloric
expenditure) intake)
Viet Nam 100.0 155.6 29.6 75.2
Sex of household head
Male 73.2 157.3 30.6 76.0
Female 26.8 150.9 26.9 72.8
Location
Urban 20.0 126.9 17.1 62.0
Rural 80.0 162.8 32.7 78.4
Region
Northern Uplands 16.7 155.5 34.8 74.8
Red River Delta 24.0 169.5 34.8 79.3
North Central Coast 13.3 152.6 33.9 76.9
South Central Coast 11.3 145.5 25.6 73.7
Central Highlands 2.7 161.9 32.6 77.6
Southeast 11.3 131.1 19.0 64.5
Mekong River Delta 20.7 159.7 24.3 75.8
Income quintile
Poorest 20.0 148.2 46.9 81.6
2nd 20.0 157.2 37.3 81.8
3rd 20.0 164.8 29.8 79.1
4th 20.0 163.3 22.0 73.2
Richest 20.0 144.7 12.0 60.1
Source: Calculated from Viet Nam Living Standards Survey 1992–93 data.
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Figure 6—Rice consumption by expenditure
decile
Source: Data from the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey,
1992–93.
Notes: The deciles are defined on the basis of the real value
of consumption expenditure per capita, including the
imputed value of home production and the rental
equivalent of housing and consumer durables. All
deciles are defined according to national rankings
rather than within urban and rural areas.
person, P is Stone’s price index, Zk are household characteristics, and αi, λij, γi, θi,
and δikare parameters to be estimated. The demand equations for the food categories
are estimated simultaneously in order to allow the imposition of symmetry on the
cross-price substitution terms.18
The food system includes 14 food categories, described in Table 32. The inde-
pendent variables include per capita consumption expenditure (x/P),food prices (pj),
and the following household characteristics (Zk): household size, the proportion of
adults in the household, the proportion of infants, dummy variables for urban house-
18 Nonfood categories are not included in the demand system, largely because of the difficulty of constructing price
indexes for them. In focusing on food demand, this study implicitly assumes weak separability in preferences be-
tween food and nonfood categories. Under weak separability, the utility function takes the form U = f(v1(q1),
v2(q2)), where v1 and v2 are subutility functions and q1 and q2 are vectors of the two categories of goods. Weak
separability between food and nonfood categories is a common assumption in applied demand analysis (Deaton and
Muellbauer 1980, 120–133).holds and female-headed households, and regional dummy variables (Table 33). For
the more homogeneous food groups, such as rice, maize, and cassava, the unit value
of transactions carried out by the household were used for prices. For heterogenous
groups, such as beverages, a price index was calculated using community prices col-
lected as part of the VLSS.TABLE 32
T a b l e   3 3
The estimation of food demand parameters was conducted separately for the north-
ern and southern parts of the country. The results for expenditure and own-price elas-
ticities are reported in Table 34. The regression equations explain between 54 and 71
percent of the variation in the budget share of rice across households. This is relatively
high for a cross-sectional demand equation, reflecting the fact that rice consumption
is largely determined by fundamental economic factors (for example, income, prices,
and household composition) rather than household-specific habits and preferences.
The model is less successful in explaining variation in the budget shares of the other
food categories. The R2 for these food groups varies between 0.08 and 0.18.TABLE 34
The expenditure elasticities are statistically significant, particularly for the staple
foods.19 The expenditure elasticity of rice varies between 0.10 in the south and 0.48
in the north, a reflection of higher incomes in the south.20 Maize and cassava are in-
48
Table 32—Dependent variables in model of food demand
Standard
Variable Description Mean deviation
rice Budget share of rice 0.2804 0.1480
mze Budget share of maize 0.0033 0.0204
ogr Budget share of other grain products (flour, bread, noodles) 0.0163 0.0217
cas Budget share of cassava 0.0025 0.0116
swp Budget share of sweet potatoes 0.0036 0.0092
leg Budget share of legumes including beans and peanuts 0.0126 0.0153
fvg Budget share of fruits and vegetables 0.0359 0.0233
port Budget share of pork 0.0556 0.0441
otmt Budget share of other meat 0.0319 0.0332
fish Budget share of fish and seafood 0.0515 0.0508
sug Budget share of sugar 0.0133 0.0149
oil Budget share of cooking oil 0.0089 0.0141
ofood Budget share of other food 0.0199 0.0229
bev Budget share of beverages including tea, coffee,
carbonated drinks, alcohol. 0.0510 0.0549
Source: Based on data from VLSS 1992–93.
19 In the AIDS model, an income coefficient that is significantly different from zero implies that the expenditure
elasticity is significantly different from 1.0
20 As incomes rise, households probably also shift toward higher-quality rice, but the data do not allow us to meas-
ure this.Table 33—Independent variables in model of food demand
Variable Description Mean St. dev.
exp Real expenditure per capita (1,000 dong/year/person) 1,458 1,047
urbexp Interaction between urban dummy variable and ln(exp) 1.406 2.809
p_rice Unit value of rice purchased (1,000 dong/kilogram) 1.986 0.408
p_mze Unit value of maize purchased (1,000 dong/kilogram) 1.526 0.746
p_otg Index of community prices of other grains  2.753 0.884
(1,000 dong/kilogram)
p_cas Unit value of cassava purchased (1,000 dong/kilogram) 0.620 0.321
p_swp Unit value of sweet potatoes purchased  0.767 0.352
(1,000 dong/kilogram)
p_leg Index of community legume prices (1,000 dong/kilogram) 3.837 0.720
p_fvg Index of community fruit and vegetable prices  1.874 0.531
(1,000 dong/kilogram)
p_port Unit value of pork purchased (1,000 dong/kilogram) 12.480 2.998
p_otmt Index of community prices of other meat  9.717 1.521
(1,000 dong/kilogram)
p_fish Index of other grain prices (1,000 dong/kilogram) 9.203 3.715
p_sug Unit value of sugar purchased (1,000 dong/kilogram) 4.774 1.539
p_oil Unit value of oil purchased by household  9.356 2.307
(1,000 dong/kilogram)
p_ofood Index of community prices of other foods 6.323 2.950
(1,000 dong/kilogram)
p_bev Index of community prices of beverage  10.849 1.957
(1,000 dong/kilogram)
hhsize Size of household (persons) 5.000 2.150
fem Dummy variable for female-headed households 0.267 0.443
pctad Proportion of household members over 15 years old 0.634 0.228
pctinf Proportion of household members under 5 years old 0.225 0.210
urb Dummy variable for urban households 0.202 0.401
reg1 Dummy variable for households in Northern Uplands 0.167 0.373
reg2 Dummy variable for households in the Red River Delta 0.244 0.430
reg3 Dummy variable for households in the North Central Coast 0.138 0.345
reg4 Dummy variable for households in the South Central Coast 0.110 0.313
reg5 Dummy variable for households in the Central Highlands 0.027 0.161
reg6 Dummy variable for households in the Southeast 0.113 0.317
Source: Based on data from the VLSS 1992–93.
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ferior goods at the mean income level,while the highest elasticities are those of other
grains (mainly wheat products), pork, other meats, sugar, and beverages.
The effect of own-prices on food demand is also shown in Table 34. Most of the
elasticities are statistically significant.21The (Marshallian) own-price elasticity of rice
demand varies from −0.20 in the north to −0.38 in the south, an indication of more
substitutability between rice and other commodities in the latter region. The other
staples are fairly price elastic, presumably due to the close substitutability with rice.
Most of the other price elasticities are close to unity, except for those of pork and oil,
whose demand is price-inelastic.
Tables 35 and 36 summarize the effects of household characteristics on food de-
mand. Other things being equal, urban households consume less maize, cassava, and
sweet potato, probably reflecting the fact that, for many rural households, the op-
portunity cost of staples is less than the market price. Urban households consume
more legumes,pork,fish,and sugar. Urban areas in the north consume more rice than
21 In the AIDS model, a significant own-price coefficient that is significantly different from zero implies that the
Hicksian own-price elasticity is significantly different from B1.
Table 34—Expenditure and price elasticities for different food categories
Food  Expenditure elasticity Own-price elasticity
category North South North South
Rice 0.48a 0.11a -0.20a -0.38a
Maize -1.47a -0.10a -4.35a -1.80a
Grains 1.55a 1.55a -1.22a -1.17
Cassava -0.74a -1.03a -1.63a -2.55a
Sweet potatoes 0.17a 0.64a -1.85a -0.69a
Legumes 1.16a 0.92 -1.04 -1.84a
Fruits and vegetables 0.80a 1.01 -0.93 -1.01
Pork 1.17a 1.30a -0.43a -0.44a
Other meat 1.50a 1.33a -1.24 -0.76
Fish 1.09a 1.05a -1.30a -1.15a
Sugar 1.45a 1.38a -1.11 -0.90
Oil 1.14a 0.63a 0.23a -0.61a
Beverage 1.28a 1.17a -1.16a -1.12a
Other food 1.22 1.34a -1.18a -1.15
Source: Econometric estimation of demand based on VLSS data.
aCoefficient is different from zero with a 95 percent statistical significance. In the case of the expendi- ture elastic-
ities, this implies that the null hypothesis that the expenditure elasticity 1.0 can be rejected, that is, that budget share
is constant across expenditure. In the case of the own-price elasticity, this implies that the null hypothesis that the
Hicksian own-price elasticity is significantly different from –1.0 can be rejected.Table 35—Effect of household characteristics on food demand in the north
Food  Urban area Female-headed household Household size Percent adults Percent infants
category Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Rice 0.35 4.84 0.001 0.32 0.001 1.085 0.046 3.674 0.062 4.907
Maize -0.155 -7.952 0.001 0.887 0 -1.224 0.005 1.535 0.002 0.731
Grains -0.007 -0.572 -0.001 -1.52 -0.001 -4.939 -0.008 -3.892 -0.006 -2.84
Cassava -0.038 -3.737 0.001 0.973 0 -0.547 0.002 1.194 0.004 2.249
Sweet potato -0.018 -2.168 0 0.204 0 2.999 0.001 0.862 0 -0.068
Legumes 0.07 5.735 0.002 2.337 0 -0.972 0 -0.239 0 -0.057
Fruits and  0.024 1.506 0.002 1.868 -0.002 -8.717 -0.003 -0.978 0.002 0.771
vegetables
Pork 0.07 2.443 -0.004 -2.401 -0.002 -4.513 -0.011 -2.28 -0.006 -1.163
Other meat -0.155 -6.179 -0.004 -2.516 -0.001 -2.216 -0.019 -4.519 -0.01 -2.306
Fish 0.041 1.474 -0.001 -0.852 0 -0.719 -0.003 -0.658 -0.008 -1.788
Sugar 0.017 1.741 -0.001 -1.09 -0.001 -3.297 -0.013 -8.022 -0.01 -6.005
Oil 0.02 2.123 0.001 1.373 0 -0.045 -0.003 -1.877 -0.001 -0.651
Beverage -0.044 -2.381 -0.008 -6.913 0.001 2.281 -0.001 -0.202 -0.006 -1.986
Other food -0.199 -6.031 -0.002 -0.825 -0.001 -1.068 -0.024 -4.331 -0.018 -3.137
Source: Econometric estimation of demand based on VLSS data.
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1Table 36—Effect of household characteristics on food demand in the south
Food  Urban area Female headed Household size Percent adults Percent infants
category Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Rice -0.639 -14.521 -0.008 -2.208 -0.001 -0.989 0.076 6.617 0.055 4.552
Maize -0.013 -2.968 0 -0.952 0 -2.411 0.001 0.609 0 0.019
Grains 0.071 4.926 0.001 0.786 0 -1.343 -0.021 -5.689 -0.009 -2.373
Cassava -0.018 -3.618 0 -0.308 0 -1.283 0.001 0.585 0.001 0.688
Sweet potato -0.002 -0.686 0 0.724 0 0.801 -0.001 -1.705 -0.001 -0.799
Legumes 0.029 3.76 0.002 2.294 -0.001 -4.048 0.003 1.442 0.004 1.642
Fruits and vegetables 0.068 4.692 0.002 1.585 -0.002 -7.252 -0.013 -3.447 -0.006 -1.477
Pork 0.101 3.798 0.003 1.203 -0.002 -3.709 -0.012 -1.722 -0.016 -2.111
Other meat 0.052 2.914 -0.002 -1.047 -0.001 -1.99 -0.017 -3.611 -0.016 -3.186
Fish 0.166 5.058 -0.001 -0.177 -0.001 -1.714 -0.017 -1.975 -0.005 -0.516
Sugar 0.056 5.746 0 -0.232 -0.001 -3.333 -0.023 -9.036 -0.017 -6.494
Oil 0.006 0.71 0.001 0.694 -0.001 -4.899 0.002 1.114 0.001 0.432
Beverage 0.031 2.728 -0.007 -7.339 0 -1.322 -0.001 -0.277 -0.001 -0.479
Other food 0.102 2.812 -0.008 -2.382 0 0.538 -0.016 -1.736 -0.016 -1.55
Source: Econometric estimation of demand based on VLSS data.
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2rural areas,whereas the opposite is true in the south. Female-headed households con-
sume more legumes and fruits and vegetables and less beverages than other house-
holds. Larger households consume less fruits and vegetables,pork,and sugar. A large
proportion of children 5 to 15 years old (the excluded category) implies less rice con-
sumption and more sugar and meat consumption.TABLE 35TABLE 36
Calorie Consumption
The estimation of food demand parameters provides important insights on the rela-
tion between rice prices and total calorie consumption. As seen in the previous sec-
tion, a 10 percent increase in rice prices results in a 2 to 4 percent decrease in rice
consumption. The effect of rice price increases on caloric intake, however, is also af-
fected by changes in the consumption of other foods. In general, higher rice prices
are expected to increase the consumption of other staples, thus dampening the effect
of higher rice prices on caloric intake.
The estimated food demand elasticities are used to quantify these effects. The elas-
ticity of caloric intake with respect to income (consumption expenditure), ηc, can be
calculated as follows:
E Q 3
where ηi is the income elasticity of food i and ωi is the contribution of food i to -
total caloric intake. The elasticity of caloric intake with respect to rice price, εcr, is
calculated as
E Q 4
where εir is the elasticity of demand for food i with respect to the price of rice.
Table 37 reports the elasticity of caloric intake with respect to income and rice
prices. The calorie income elasticities imply that a 10 percent increase in income is
associated with a 5 percent increase in caloric intake. The calorie-income elasticities
are higher than the rice-income elasticities because, as income rises, caloric intake
rises from several sources in addition to rice. As expected, calorie income elastici-
ties are higher in the north than in the south. Because the north is poorer,a larger pro-
portion of additional spending goes to food and to staple foods in particular, com-
pared with the south.TABLE 37
The calorie-rice price elasticities suggest that a 10 percent increase in rice prices
would result in a 2 percent reduction in caloric intake. The calorie-rice price elastic-
ities are lower than the price elasticity of rice demand. The reason is that a higher

















The VLSS reveals that the importance of rice in Viet Nam is not limited to the delta
regions. Even in the northern and central highlands, it accounts for three-quarters of
the caloric intake of the average household. Per capita rice consumption is lower
among urban households than rural ones. In addition,rice consumption rises with in-
come at low- and middle-income levels, but it falls as income rises further. Using re-
gression analysis, the study estimates that the expenditure elasticity of the rice de-
mand is 0.38 at the mean income level, while the price elasticity is −0.24. The price
and income elasticities estimated from the food demand model imply that the elas-
ticity of caloric intake with respect to income is 0.5, while the elasticity of caloric
intake with respect to the rice price is −0.2.
The relationship between income and rice demand in Asia is the subject of some
debate. Using panel data for 14 Asian countries, Ito, Peterson, and Grant (1989)
found that rice was an inferior good in half of them. Huang, David, and Duff (1991),
however,re-estimated the elasticities using different methods and concluded that rice
was inferior only in the higher-income Asian countries: Japan, Malaysia, Singapore,
Taiwan, and Thailand. Huang and David (1993) noted that rice demand is constant
or falling in a number of Asian countries, including Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan,
but that much of this is the result of urbanization rather than income growth.
The results here are broadly consistent with these trends. Cross-sectional analy-
sis using 1993 data finds that the income elasticity of rice demand in Viet Nam is
small but positive. And the trends in apparent consumption suggest that in spite of
rapid income growth, per capita rice demand has been relatively flat since 1993.
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Table 37—Calorie elasticities
Elasticity Viet Nam North South
Elasticity of caloric intake with 0.53 0.61 0.35
respect to income
Elasticity of caloric intake with -0.21 -0.18 -0.31
respect to rice price
Source: Calculated from the estimated demand elasticities in Table 35 and caloric shares for each food category
(see text).I
t is clear from previous chapters that rice plays an important role in the Vietnamese
economy and that the government is concerned about the impact of rice market
liberalization on the poor. A key question, therefore, is what effect does a change in
rice prices have on incomes and poverty in Viet Nam? As discussed in Chapter 1,
higher food prices almost always have a negative effect on urban households, but the
effect on rural households is ambiguous. In order to assess the overall effect on
poverty, information on the distribution of poverty must be combined with informa-
tion on the impact of higher rice prices on different household types.
This chapter begins with a description of the distribution of poverty in Viet Nam.
Next, household data on rice production and consumption are used to calculate the
short-term elasticity of real income with respect to rice prices. Finally, all of this in-
formation is combined to estimate the effect of uniform higher rice prices on the
poverty rate. This analysis is extended in Chapter 6 to consider the effect of market
liberalization on rice prices and hence on incomes and poverty.
Poverty in Viet Nam
The General Statistics Office (GSO) has traditionally obtained information on house-
hold living standards using journals completed by households. These journals were
collected annually, aggregated by local GSO officials, and sent to GSO headquar-
ters. Surveys of this type were used to collect information on household expenditure,
income, and assets, but the sample coverage was limited to selected provinces. In
1990, GSO carried out a direct-interview survey of household production activities
in five provinces (World Bank 1995).
The first nationally representative household survey using direct interviews was
the 1992–93 Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (VLSS),described in Chapter 4. The
World Bank carried out a poverty assessment using the VLSS data with upper and
lower poverty lines. According to these calculations, 51 percent of the population
lives below the upper poverty line and 41 percent lives below the lower poverty line,
although there is considerable regional variation (World Bank 1995).
This section describes the incidence and depth of poverty among different groups
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CHAPTER 5
Poverty and Rice Pricesof households based on a reanalysis of the VLSS data. The analysis here differs from
that of the World Bank in two respects. First, this report excludes from the analysis
287 households whose per capita caloric intake is either too high (above 3,500 calo-
ries) or too low (below 1,000 calories) to be plausible. Since food consumption ac-
counts for more than half of consumption expenditure,implausible caloric intake fig-
ures may suggest unreliable measurement of consumption expenditure. Household
weights are used to ensure that this exclusion does not affect the importance of each
region in the analysis. Second, a more restrictive, relative definition of poverty is
adopted here because the focus of the analysis is on the variation in poverty across
groups and in changes in poverty under different policy scenarios, rather than the
level of poverty using an internationally comparable poverty line. Furthermore, for
the purposes of this study, a more restrictive definition of poverty corresponds more
closely to the group that policymakers would like to protect from adverse effects.
Thus,the poor are defined as those in the bottom 25 percent in terms of real per capita
consumption expenditure.22
Table 38 describes the degree of poverty in each household group using three of
the poverty measures identified by Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984).23 P0 is sim-
ply the incidence of poverty (the proportion of households falling below the poverty
line). P1 is the poverty gap index, defined as the incidence of poverty multiplied by
the gap between the poverty line and the average income among the poor. P2 is an
index of the severity of poverty, taking into account not just the proportion of poor
households and the average income of the poor, but the variance of income among
the poor. The last three columns of Table 38 show the proportion of national poverty
that each household group represents.TABLE 38
Table 38 highlights the fact that rural poverty is more widespread and more severe
than urban poverty. In fact, the poverty rate (P0) is almost four times higher in the
rural areas than in urban areas. As a result, 94 to 96 percent of Vietnamese poverty
is located in rural areas.
With regard to regional differences,the North Central Coast and the Northern Up-
lands have the largest proportion of poor households according to P0, but poverty is
most severe in the Central Highlands according to P2. Being poor or heavily popu-
lated, or both, the three northern regions together account for more than two-thirds
of the poverty in Viet Nam. Although poverty is most severe in the Central Highlands,
its small population means that it accounts for only 2 to 5 percent of national poverty.
Farmers, who represent 74 percent of the population, have a poverty rate three
times that of nonfarmers. As a result, they account for more than 90 percent of the
poverty in Viet Nam. The fact that poverty is greater among farmers than among ru-
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22 Consumption expenditure includes the value of home-produced food,consumption purchases,and the rental value
of consumer durables and owner-occupied housing. Local prices are used to value nonmarket transactions. A price
index is used to adjust for differences in the cost of living across regions and between urban and rural areas.
23 The class of measures is defined by Pa = (1/N) Σ [(x–xi)/x]a, where N is the total population, x is the poverty line,
xiis the income of poor household i, and the summation is limited to poor households. ral households in general implies that nonfarm rural households tend to be better off
than farming rural households.
A more detailed picture of the geographic distribution of rural poverty can be ob-
tained by combining information from the VLSS with district level data from the
1994 Agricultural Census. First, the VLSS data are used to estimate the probability
that a household is poor as a function of 19 household characteristics and 6 regional
dummy variables. The household characteristics include household size and compo-
sition, farm size, food production, proportion of land in perennial crops, ownership
of different types of livestock,size and building material of house,type of water sup-
ply, and ownership of radios, televisions, and motorbikes. Next, the district-level av-
erage values are compiled for these same 19 indicators and dummy variables from
the 1994 Agricultural Census. Finally, these district-level values are inserted into the
poverty equation obtained in the first step. This gives a poverty indicator at the dis-
trict level that can be mapped using geographic information system (GIS) software
(Minot 1998; Minot 2000).
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Table 38—Poverty rates and distribution of poor households
Contribution to 
Share of Poverty index national poverty
Household category population P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2
(percent)
Viet Nam 100.0 25.0 6.1 2.3 100.0 100.0 100.0
Location
Urban 20.0 7.6 1.6 0.5 6.1 5.4 4.4
Rural 80.0 29.4 7.2 2.7 93.9 94.6 95.6
Region
Northern Uplands 16.7 34.9 8.3 3.0 23.3 22.8 22.0
Red River Delta 24.0 25.1 6.6 2.7 24.1 26.0 28.6
Northern Central Coast 13.3 40.4 9.8 3.5 21.5 21.4 20.7
Southern Central Coast 11.3 20.0 4.9 1.8 9.0 9.1 8.9
Central Highlands 2.7 21.9 7.9 3.8 2.4 3.5 4.5
Southeast 11.3 12.1 2.6 0.9 5.5 4.8 4.3
Mekong River Delta 20.7 17.2 3.6 1.2 14.2 12.2 11.1
Occupation
Farmer 73.7 30.7 7.5 2.8 90.4 90.8 91.9
Nonfarmer 26.3 9.1 2.1 0.7 9.5 9.2 8.1
Source: Data from the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey.
Notes: Poverty is defined as households below the 25th percentile in terms of per capita consumption expendi-
ture.P0,P1,and P2refer to three of the poverty measures in the class identified by Foster,Greer,and Thor-
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Figure 7—Geographic distribution of povertyThe results of this analysis are presented in Figure 7. More than half of the poor-
est 50 districts are concentrated along the northern and western edges of the North-
ern Uplands. These are remote mountainous regions with large ethnic minority pop-
ulations. Other pockets of poverty can be found in the northwestern section of the
North Central Coast and the northern part of the Central Highlands. None of the poor-
est 50 districts is on the coast,and none are in the deltas or in the Southeast. The dark-
est shade represents the least poor districts. Almost all the districts in the Mekong,
the Red River Delta, and the Southeast fall into this category.FIG. 7
Rice Marketing Patterns and Household Welfare 
The direct welfare effect of higher food prices on a household depends on its net sales
position, as noted by Mellor (1978). Households who are net sellers, such as com-
mercial farmers, gain from higher prices, while those who are net buyers, such as ur-
ban consumers and landless rural households, lose.24 Mellor’s data from India re-
vealed that only the poorest quintile of rural households were net buyers.
Other studies show a surprisingly high proportion of net food buyers among rural
households in developing countries. Weber et al. (1988) reviewed the results from
five studies in Sub-Saharan Africa,showing that 15 to 73 percent of farm households
are net buyers, depending on the crop and the country. Barrett and Dorosh (1996) es-
timate that net buyers of rice account for 49 percent of the farmers in Madagascar,
while Sahn (1998) finds that 84 percent of the rural households in Sri Lanka are net
buyers of rice. A study of Thailand found that net buyers of rice represented 58 per-
cent of rural households and 25 percent of rice farmers (Trairatvorakul 1984).
A number of studies have quantified the welfare impact of food price changes.
Computable general equilibrium models have been widely used to examine the im-
pact of policy on different household groups (for example, see Bourguignon, de
Melo, and Morrison 1991). These models are comprehensive in tracing the effects
of policy on land, labor, and capital markets, as well as interaction between agricul-
tural and nonagricultural sectors. However, they often do not provide the distribu-
tional detail of partial equilibrium approaches.
Trairatvorakul (1984) estimates the effect of rice price increases on the poverty
rate and caloric intake. Deaton (1989) combines household data and hypothesized
price changes to study the distributional effect of higher rice prices in Thailand. Sim-
ilar methods were adopted in studies of the distributional effect of higher food prices
in Côte d’Ivoire (Budd 1993) and in Madagascar (Barrett and Dorosh 1996).
Deaton (1989) highlights the importance of the net benefit ratio (NBR), defined
as the value of net sales of a commodity as a proportion of income. The NBR for a
commodity can be interpreted as the “before-response” or “impact” elasticity of real
income with respect to the price of that commodity. The NBR is a very short-term
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24 This reasoning applies only to the direct effect of prices on households. Households may also be affected by in-
direct effects, such as changes in the labor market or changes in the demand for nonfarm goods and services.measure in that it assumes no response from households as producers or as con-
sumers. Furthermore, it assumes no change in labor markets or nonfarm income that
might result from the price change.
The VLSS provides detailed information on the patterns of rice consumption and
production for different types of households. Table 39 gives the budget share of rice
(the value of rice consumption as a percentage of consumption expenditure), the in-
come share of rice (the value of rice production as a percentage of consumption ex-
penditure), and the NBR for rice (the income share minus the budget share). On av-
erage, rice production is equivalent to 31.5 percent of household income, while the
mean budget share of rice is 29.6 percent. The NBR is 1.9 percent (31.5 to 29.6).
Thus, a 10 percent increase in farmgate and retail rice prices would raise real income
0.19 percent, on average. TABLE 39
Among urban households, rice production is minimal (3.3 percent of income),
while rice consumption represents 17 percent of income. The negative NBR for ur-
ban households implies that they are net buyers and will lose from higher rice prices.
Among rural households, rice production and rice consumption are much larger rel-
ative to income, and the NBR is positive, implying that rural households are net sell-
ers and will, on average, gain from higher rice prices. For a given price increase, the
loss for the average urban household is more than twice as large as the gain for the
average rural household.
Turning to regional patterns, the importance of rice in household incomes is high-
est in the Red River Delta (42 percent) and the Mekong River Delta (38 percent) and
lowest in the urbanized Southeast (14 percent). The budget share of rice ranges from
almost 35 percent in the two northernmost regions to just 19 percent in the South-
east. This pattern reflects regional variation in income: the northern regions tend to
be poorer, while the Southeast (which includes Ho Chi Minh City) has the highest
average income. The NBR is negative in the five rice-deficit regions, and positive in
the two delta regions. The overall positive NBR is explained by the fact that the two
delta regions account for 45 percent of the population. Futhermore, the absolute
value of the positive NBRs in the deltas is larger than that of the negative NBRs in
the deficit regions.
Rice marketing patterns naturally vary widely between farmers and nonfarmers.
Among farmers,one-third of their income is allocated to rice,but rice production rep-
resents 42 percent of income, resulting in a positive NBR. Nonfarmers have much
smaller rice budget shares (reflecting their higher income),but negligible production,
yielding a negative NBR.25
Table 39 also reveals that the budget share of rice falls from 45 percent for the
poorest quartile to 13 percent for the richest. The importance of rice production rel-
ative to income also falls with higher income. Although rich rice farmers produce and
sell larger amounts of rice than poor rice farmers, rich households are less likely to
be rice farmers in the first place. The NBR does not show a consistent pattern, with
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25 Farmers and nonfarmers are defined according to the most important source of income. Thus, under this defini-
tion, a nonfarmer may have some agricultural production and income.the second quartile appearing to gain less from rice price increases than the other
quartiles.
The last three columns of Table 39 show the percentage of households that are
net sellers (NBR > 0), that have no net sales (NBR = 0), and that are net buyers
(NBR < 0). Overall,less than one-third of Vietnamese households are net sellers who
would gain in the short run from higher rice prices.26 Less than 40 percent of rural
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Table 39—Rice production, consumption, and net sales by household group
Rice Rice Net sales
production consumption of rice
as percent as percent as percent Net Zero net Net
of income of income of income sellers position buyers of
Household category (PR) (CR) (NBR) of rice in rice rice
(average percentage) (percent of households)
Viet Nam 31.5 29.6 1.9 32.4 7.2 60.4
Location
Urban 3.3 17.1 -13.8 4.1 1.0 94.9
Rural 38.5 32.7 5.8 39.5 8.7 51.8
Region
Northern Uplands 28.8 34.8 -6.0 24.1 14.1 61.8
Red River Delta 42.5 34.8 7.7 45.9 8.7 45.4
North Central Coast 32.6 33.9 -1.3 31.7 9.5 58.8
South Central Coast 19.3 25.6 -6.3 18.4 5.7 75.9
Central Highlands 19.3 32.6 -13.4 10.0 7.5 82.5
Southeast 14.3 19.0 -4.8 16.6 2.3 81.0
Mekong River Delta 37.8 24.3 13.6 43.1 1.1 55.2
Occupation
Farmer 42.5 33.7 8.8 44.0 9.4 46.6
Nonfarmer 0.5 18.2 -17.7 0.0 0.8 99.2
Income group
1st (poorest) quartile 47.5 45.5 2.1 38.8 10.8 50.4
2nd quartile 34.8 34.5 0.2 33.8 6.6 59.5
3rd quartile 27.8 25.1 2.7 32.2 6.6 61.3
4th quartile 15.9 13.3 2.5 24.9 4.7 70.4
Source: Calculated from data from the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (1992–93).
Notes: PR is the production ratio, CR is the consumption ratio, and NBR is the net benefit ratio.
26 As noted earlier, the production figures were adjusted to reflect the 12 percent increase in rice output between the
1992–93 VLSS survey and the calibration year (1995). Information is not available on how this increase was dis-
tributed among households, so it is assumed that the proportion of net sellers did not change. To the extent that the
number of surplus rice farmers increased between 1992–93 and 1995, the proportion of net sellers will be
underestimated. households have net rice sales and somewhat more than half are net buyers. The pro-
portion of net sellers is,as expected,highest in the two delta regions,but even in these
two regions net sellers account for less than half of the households. Finally, the pro-
portion of net sellers is higher among low-income groups than among high-income
groups, though even in the lowest quartile surplus households make up less than 40
percent of the total.
Overall, it is notable that the proportion of households with zero net position in
rice markets is small. More than 90 percent of rural households have some interac-
tion with rice markets, either as buyers or as sellers. The proportion of households
with zero net sales rises from barely 1 percent in the Mekong to 14 percent in the
Northern Uplands,reflecting the increasing degree of orientation to subsistence farm-
ing as one moves north. Furthermore,poor households are twice as likely as rich ones
to not participate in the market at all. This may be because the poor are often farm-
ers in remote areas with high transaction costs, or it may be related to risk aversion
among poor households.
In summary, 6 out of 10 households and 5 out of 7 regions are net buyers of rice,
implying that a majority would lose from higher rice prices in the short run. The re-
gion that would gain the most, the Mekong River Delta, is one of the richest, while
the region that would lose the most, the Central Highlands, is one of the poorest. As
shown later, the actual distributional effect of higher rice prices is less negative than
suggested by these figures.
Rice Prices and Poverty
The previous section examined the rice marketing patterns to determine which groups
of households would lose and which would gain from an increase in rice prices. In
this section, household-level marketing data from the VLSS are used to estimate the
impact of a uniform 10 percent increase in rice prices on real income and poverty.
Two expressions are used for the real income effect, one for the “before-response”
effect and another for the “after-response” effect. The before-response effect refers
to the effect in the very short term, before producers and consumers respond to the
price change. The after-response effect refers to the effect after they respond to the
new prices27 (the derivation of these equations is given in Appendix 2). The before-
response welfare effect of changes in rice prices is given by
E Q 5
where ∆wi
1 = the first-order approximation of the change in welfare for



















27 The after-response welfare effect could describe either short- or long-term effects, depending on the type of elas-
ticities used. 
(5)x0i = original income (consumption expenditure) of household i,
p0r
p = the original value of the price used to value rice production in
region r,
p0r
c = the original value of the price used to value rice consumption
in region r,
PRir = the value of rice production for household i as a proportion of
x0i, and
CRir = the value of rice consumption for household i as a proportion
of x0i.
The after-response income effect is calculated using:
E Q 6
where ∆wi
2 = the second-order approximation of the change in welfare for
household i of a change in rice price,
εrr
S = the own-price elasticity of rice supply, and
εrr
H = the own-price Hicksian elasticity of rice demand.
These expressions are extensions of the NBR used to study the distributional impact
of food price changes in several studies (Deaton 1989; Budd 1993; and Barrett and
Dorosh 1996). Equation (5) is similar to the NBR calculation except that it allows the
percentage change in producer prices to differ from that of consumer prices. Equa-
tion (6) is like equation (5), except that it includes terms to represent the response of
consumers and producers to the price changes. If the elasticities in equation (6) are
set at zero and the percentage changes in producer and consumer prices are equal to
each other, this expression collapses to the NBR used in previous studies.
The values of PRir and CRir are based on the 1992–93 VLSS, with adjustments
to reflect the 12 percent increase in rice production between the survey and the cal-
ibration year (1995). The supply elasticities are based on an econometric analysis of
time-series data by Khiem and Pingali (1995), while the demand elasticities are
based on the demand analysis described in Chapter 4.
The first column of Table 40 shows the before-response effect of a 10 percent in-
crease in rice prices on the real income of different household groups. Because the
producer and consumer prices are both assumed to increase by the same 10 percent,
the first column is simply the NBR (= PR − CR) multiplied by the proportional price
increase (0.1). Rural households, residents of the two delta regions, and farmers gain
from the increase in rice prices. But nonfarmers, urban households, and residents of
the five deficit regions lose. The net effect is a small positive effect, indicating that















































(6)The second column gives the after-response effects of the rice price increase on
Vietnamese households. In all cases, the after-response effects are somewhat more
positive than the before-response effects. This result reflects the general rule that the
welfare effects of a price change are more positive when consumer and producer re-
sponses are incorporated. However, the differences between short- and long-term ef-
fects are small, around 0.1 percentage points, as a result of the relatively inelastic de-
mand and supply.
The last three columns give the incidence of poverty (P0) before and after the 10
percent increase in rice prices. The effect of the rice price change on the poverty rate
is estimated by adjusting the real income of each household in the sample and cal-
culating the proportion of households whose new income falls below the original
poverty line. Not surprisingly, the urban poverty rate rises one percentage point, as
do poverty rates in the five deficit regions. Poverty rates fall in the two surplus delta
regions. The net effect is a small increase in the national poverty rate, from 25.0 to
25.2 percent in the long term.
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Table 40—Effect of a 10 percent increase in rice prices by household group
Average change in Poverty rate
Household real income Before After short-
category Impact Short-term impact After impact term
(percent) (percent)
Viet Nam 0.2 0.3 25.0 25.3 25.2
Location
Urban -1.4 -1.4 7.6 8.6 8.6
Rural 0.6 0.7 29.4 29.4 29.4
Region
Northern Uplands -0.6 -0.5 34.9 35.5 35.5
Red River Delta 0.8 0.9 25.1 24.6 24.6
North Central Coast -0.1 -0.1 40.4 41.7 41.5
South Central Coast -0.6 -0.5 20.0 20.5 20.5
Central Highlands -1.3 -1.2 21.9 22.7 22.7
Southeast -0.5 -0.4 12.1 12.9 12.9
Mekong River Delta 1.4 1.5 17.2 16.9 16.9
Occupation
Farmer 0.9 1.0 30.7 30.5 30.5
Nonfarmer -1.8 -1.7 9.1 10.5 10.5
Income group
1st (poorest) quartile 0.2 0.3 100.0 96.8 96.8
2nd quartile 0.0 0.1 0.0 4.2 4.2
3rd quartile 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
4th quartile 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Household-level simulations based on data from the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey, 1992–93.It should be emphasized that these calculations do not incorporate general equi-
librium effects. In particular, they do not take into account the effects of higher rice
prices on the demand for labor and wage rates,which affect household income. Since
rice production is likely to be more labor-intensive than many alternative economic
activities, higher rice prices would be expected to increase the demand for labor and
wage rates. To the extent that the poor obtain a significant share of their income from
agricultural labor, this would strengthen the poverty-reducing effect of higher rice
prices. This was found to be a significant factor in a general equilibrium analysis of
Thai rice prices (Warr 1997). As discussed in Chapter 2, however, landlessness and
the use of hired labor are less common in Viet Nam, so the effect of rice prices on
income via wage rates is likely to be weaker.
Conclusions 
Viet Nam is a poor country in which 80 percent of the population lives in the rural
areas. However, poverty is not evenly distributed throughout the country. Poverty is
almost four times as widespread and five times as severe in the rural areas as in the
urban areas. Furthermore, poverty tends to be concentrated in the more remote, hilly
regions, namely the North Central Coast, the Northern Uplands, and the Central
Highlands.
The effect of rice price changes on household welfare depends on the net sales
position of the household: net sellers of rice will benefit from higher prices while
net buyers will lose. Household survey data suggest that the two delta regions, with
45 percent of the population, are surplus regions that would gain from higher rice
prices, while the other five regions are rice-deficit areas that would lose on average.
Higher prices would also benefit the average rural household at the expense of urban
households.
A uniform 10 percent increase in rice prices would hurt urban households, non-
farmers, and residents of the five deficit regions, although the effect on real income
would be less than 2 percent on average. The price increase would benefit farmers in
general, particularly those in the Red River Delta and the Mekong Delta. Average in-
come in Viet Nam would rise by 0.3 percent on average in the long run. Somewhat
paradoxically, in spite of the higher average income, the poverty rate would rise
slightly from 25.0 to 25.2 percent in the long run. Overall, it is surprising that al-
though only one-third of Vietnamese households are net sellers of rice, higher rice
prices have virtually no effect on the incidence of poverty. This suggests that many
of the poor are rural farmers who either (1) have net sales of rice, (2) are self-
sufficient in rice, or (3) purchase such small quantities that higher rice prices have
negligible effects on them.
The effect of a specific policy, such as export liberalization, will differ from the
results presented here for two reasons. First, the change in rice prices will not be uni-
form across regions. Second,the percentage change in producer and consumer prices
will not be the same. In the next chapter, the analysis is extended to simulate the ef-
fects of policy changes on rice prices in each region and the resulting effects on in-
come and poverty among different household groups.
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iet Nam no longer faces the threat of general food shortages that plagued the
country in the 1980s. As a food exporter, however, it faces new policy issues,
most notably the trade-off between maintaining low prices for domestic consumers
and generating foreign exchange from rice exports. In an effort to ensure domestic
food security, the government imposes a binding quota on rice exports. In addition,
there have been restrictions on the movement of rice within the country, partly in or-
der to control the smuggling of rice into China.
In this chapter, a spatial equilibrium model of food markets in Viet Nam is used
to examine the effects of adopting alternative policies regarding rice exports and in-
ternal rice trade, concentrating, in particular, on the effects of alternative rice export
policies and the effect of the restrictions on internal trade. The distributional conse-
quences of these policies are examined by linking the results of the model to house-
hold data on rice consumption and production patterns. Finally, a brief epilogue ex-
amines the initial impact of rice market reforms undertaken in the wake of this study.
Methods 
Description of the Model 
The Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model (VASEM) simulates the mar-
kets for four staple foods in seven regions of the country. The four commodities are
rice, maize, sweet potatoes, and cassava, although the results presented here focus
on rice, which is by far the most important staple in Viet Nam. The regions are the
seven agroclimatic zones illustrated in Figure 1 on page 10.
The supply of each crop in each region is determined by the producer prices of all
four commodities in that region using double-log supply functions and the short- and
long-run own-price elasticities estimated econometrically by Khiem and Pingali
(1995). Demand is a function of the consumer prices, per capita expenditure, and a
price index,using a linear approximation of the Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton
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CHAPTER 6
Impact of Further Liberalization 
of Rice Marketsand Muellbauer 1980). The demand parameters are those estimated econometrically
in Chapter 4. Key supply and demand elasticities are shown in Table 41.TABLE 41
Markets in the model follow the rules of spatial arbitrage: trade between two re-
gions occurs when the price difference between them reaches the transfer cost (the
full cost of transporting and marketing goods from one region to the other). The price
difference between two regions can equal the transfer cost (in which case there is
trade between the two) or be less than the transfer costs (in which case, there is no
trade between the two). This transfer cost is the estimated cost of transportation and
marketing based on the results of the IFPRI survey of traders or the observed price
difference between the two markets,whichever is greater. Commodities are imported
when the wholesale price in a region rises as high as the import parity price for that
region and exported when it falls as low as the region’s export parity price.
Because Viet Nam accounts for 9 to 17 percent of world rice exports, the “large
country” assumption is used and world rice prices are made endogenous. In the ab-
sence of estimates of the export demand elasticity for Vietnamese rice,the export de-
mand elasticity for Thai rice is adopted, which is implicit in the model of world trade
developed by Tyers and Anderson (1988). After adjusting for differences in the rel-
ative size of rice exports,the short-term export demand elasticity for Vietnamese rice
is −15, while the long-term elasticity is −30 (see Appendix 3 for more details).
The model is calibrated to reflect Vietnamese food markets in 1995. It is solved us-
ing mixed complementarity programming (MCP) with the General Algebraic Mod-
eling System (GAMS) software. MCP offers numerous advantages over the quadratic
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Table 41—Elasticities of supply of and demand for rice used in the model
Marshallian
Income own-price Own-price elasticity 
elasticity elasticity  of rice supply
Region of rice demand of rice demand Short-run Long-run
Northern Uplands 0.51 -0.23 0.38 0.41
Red River Delta 0.48 -0.19 0.38 0.41
North Central Coast 0.49 -0.19 0.38 0.41
South Central Coast 0.17 -0.41 0.31 0.35
Central Highlands 0.39 -0.51 0.31 0.35
Southeast -0.05 -0.28 0.31 0.35
Mekong River Delta 0.11 -0.39 0.31 0.35
National average 0.31 -0.29 0.34 0.37
Source: Supply elasticities derived from Khiem and Pingali (1995). Demand elasticities from regression analy-
sis of household data from the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (1992–93) (see Chapter 4 for method
used).
Note: The national averages of the demand elasticities are calculated as the consumption-weighted means of
the regional elasticities, while the national averages of the supply elasticities are calculated as the pro-
duction-weighted means of the regional elasticities.programming approach pioneered by Takayama and Judge (1970): supply and de-
mand functions can be nonlinear,income effects can be incorporated into the demand
equation,and quantitative restrictions can be imposed on trade (see Rutherford 1995).
Appendix 4 contains the equations in the model.
Distributional Effects 
The model simulates the impact of policy on supply, demand, prices, and income in
each region, but it does not tell us how the policy affects different types of house-
holds within each region. The distributional effects of alternative policies are simu-
lated by combining the regional producer and consumer rice prices from the model
with household data on rice production and consumption patterns. Equation 6, de-
scribed in Chapter 5, is used to estimate the welfare impact of changes in rice prices
on different types of households.
Base Scenario
In the base scenario (reflecting the situation in 1995), the Mekong River Delta pro-
duces rice surpluses of 4.5 million tons,of which 2.0 million tons are shipped to other
regions in the country and 2.5 million tons are exported. The export quota in 1995
was just 2.0 million tons, but large volumes of rice were smuggled into China. Both
informal estimates and food balance estimates indicate that informal exports were
about 0.5 million tons. The only other surplus region is the Red River Delta which
supplies 190,000 tons of rice to the Northern Uplands.
Rice prices reflect these internal trade flows. Rice prices are lowest in the Mekong
Delta and progressively higher as one moves north. In the Mekong, the retail price
of rice is D2,345 per kilogram, or US$213 per ton, while in the Northern Uplands it
is D3,220 per kilogram, or US$293 per ton. By comparison, the average f.o.b. price
of Vietnamese rice exports in 1995 was US$269. The gap between the Mekong price
and the border price is the result of the rice export quota, as discussed in the next
section.
Rice Export Policy
This section examines the effects of alternative rice export policies on rice markets,
income, and income distribution using VASEM. Alternative policies include elimi-
nating the rice export quota, adjusting the level of the quota, and replacing the quota
with an export tax. The model can be used to simulate the short-run impact (after one
year) or the long-run impact (after full adjustment), depending on which parameters
are used for domestic supply and international rice demand. The results of these sim-
ulations are compared to the base scenario, designed to simulate conditions in 1995
with the rice export quota.
68Eliminating the Rice Export Quota 
A binding export quota reduces the domestic price of the commodity by reducing the
demand as perceived by producers. The qualitative impact of an export quota is il-
lustrated in Figure 8. The world price and the domestic price without the export quota
are represented by Pw = Pd.At this price, domestic demand is Dm and supply is Sm,
so exports are Sm − Dm. When an export quota equal to Sq − Dq is imposed, the do-
mestic price falls to Pdq. If the country is “large” in the market for this good, the re-
duction in exports will increase the world price to Pwq. The gap between the world
price (Pwq) and domestic price (Pdq) under the quota is the implicit tax imposed by
the export restrictions.FIGURE8
The benefits to consumers from the lower price associated with the export quota
is represented by area A,28 while the cost to producers is represented by A + B + C +










Figure 8—Effect of an export quota (large-country assumption)
28 To be more precise,the cost to consumers is the area behind the Hicksian,or compensated,demand curve,as shown
in the derivation of the welfare measure in Appendix 4. The difference between the two is small in most cases.of B + C + D. At the same time, the exporters who are given export permits29 earn
quota rents equal to the volume of exports multiplied by the gap between the do-
mestic price and the higher world price, equivalent to area C + E. The net loss to the
country as a whole from imposing the export quota is B + D − E, where B + D rep-
resents the deadweight loss and E represents the terms-of-trade gain.
If the country is “small,”the reduction in its exports does not affect the world price,
so there is no terms-of-trade effect (E = 0). Thus, any export quota reduces national
income. For a “large” country, it is possible for the terms-of-trade effects of a quota
to be larger than the deadweight loss (E > B + D), implying that the country gains
from the quota. This is more likely when the foreign demand for the export good is
relatively inelastic and when the implicit tax associated with the quota is small.30
These issues are discussed further in the context of the policy simulations.
The model indicates that the export quota is equivalent to a US$60 per ton tax on
rice exports.31 Since the with-quota world price (Pwq) is US$269, the export quota
has the same effect on prices, production, and consumption as a 22 percent export
tax (60/269 = 0.22). It also implies that the quota rents have a value of US$150 mil-
lion (2.5 million tons at US$60 per ton).
Table 42 summarizes the impact of removing the export quota in the short and long
runs. The short-run simulation uses supply elasticities and international demand elas-
ticities that represent the effect within one year. In the short run, eliminating the rice
export quota would raise the average consumer price of rice 20 percent,reducing rice
consumption 4 percent and expanding rice production almost 7 percent, compared
with the base scenario. These changes in production and consumption allow exports
to rise from 2.5 to 3.9 million tons. Because Viet Nam is a “large country” in rice
markets, export liberalization reduces the world price by 3.7 percent. This large-
country effect reduces the gains to export liberalization and dampens the increase in
domestic prices.TABLE 42
The short-run increase in household income, which refers to the effect of food
prices on consumers and producers (area B + C + D), is US$178 million or 1.3 per-
cent. The increase in total income, which includes changes in household income and
changes in quota rents (B + D − E), is US$28 million. These estimates do not include
the indirect, or general equilibrium, effects of the quota removal such as those re-
lated to changes in wages or nonfarm income.
The quota rent, which was US$150 million in the base scenario, disappears when
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29 Exporters may have to pay for the export permits, either formally to the government or informally to the gov-
ernment officials who allocate the permits. In this case, exporters share the quota rents with the government or
government officials. 
30 The country is also more likely to gain from export restrictions (such as a quota) if domestic supply and demand
are relatively elastic and if exports are small relative to domestic production.
31 In mixed complementarity programming, every inequality constraint is associated with a complementary variable
that indicates the shadow price of the constraint. The complementary variable associated with the export quota is
the export tax equivalent (in absolute terms) of the quota.the quota is eliminated. Most of the quota rent (US$125 million) is transferred to pro-
ducers (area C in Figure 8), but some (US$25 million) is transferred to foreign buy-
ers in the form of lower world prices (area E in Figure 8).
The long-run effects of quota removal are more favorable in terms of exports, out-
put, and income, as shown in the last two columns of Table 42. After producers ad-
just fully to the higher prices, rice output expands 8 percent and exports rise to 4.1
million tons. In addition, the foreign demand for Vietnamese rice exports is more
elastic in the long run, since the lower world price gradually induces other exporting
countries to scale back and rice buyers to expand imports. Thus, the world price re-
bounds partially, ending up 2.1 percent below the base scenario, compared with 3.7
percent below in the short run. Because the world price is slightly higher in the long
run than in the short, domestic rice prices are also slightly higher.
In the long run, household income rises US$202 million, while total income in-
creases US$52 million. The gains are higher than in the short run partly because Viet-
namese rice producers have time to adjust fully to the higher prices, but mostly be-
cause world demand is more elastic in the long run.32 In the long run, only US$17
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Table 42—Overall effects of eliminating the rice export quota
Eliminate rice export quota
Short-run Long-run
Base Percent Percent
Variable Unit scenario Level change Level change
Rice price Dong/kg 2,781 3,345 20.3 3,391 22.0
Paddy price Dong/kg 1,503 1,863 24.0 1,892 25.9
Paddy production 1,000 tons 24,949 26,640 6.8 26,969 8.1
Rice production 1,000 tons 13,865 14,805 6.8 14,988 8.1
Rice consumption 1,000 tons 11,333 10,881 -4.0 10,848 -4.3
Rice exports 1,000 tons 2,532 3,924 55.0 4,139 63.5
Rice export price US$/ton 269 259 -3.7 263 -2.1
Rice export value US$million 681 1,016 49.3 1,089 60.0
Household income US$million/year 13,567 13,745 1.3 13,769 1.5
Total income US$million/year 13,716 13,745 0.2 13,769 0.4
Price index base=100 100 104 4.6 105 5.0
Source: Simulation using the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model.
32 As shown in Table 41, the difference between the short- and long-run supply elasticities as estimated by Khiem
and Pingali (1994) is fairly small. In the sensitivity analysis, the effect of assuming a more elastic supply of rice on
the quota removal simulation is described.million of the US$150 million in quota rents is transferred to foreign buyers, while
the remaining US$133 million is transferred to domestic farmers.
Table 43 demonstrates that the long-run impact of the quota removal has a strong
regional dimension: the percentage changes in production, consumption, and rice
prices are substantially larger in the south than in the north. For example, consumer
rice prices rise 25 to 26 percent in the two southern regions, 22 to 23 percent in the
next two regions to the north, and 19 to 20 percent in the northern three regions. This
pattern is the result of rice prices that were initially higher in the north,so that a given
absolute increase in the rice price is a smaller percentage change.TABLE 43
Two points can be made regarding Table 43. First, price shocks in the Mekong are
not fully transmitted (in percentage terms) to the “interior” regions.33Although par-
tial transmission of price shocks is often attributed to trade barriers or inefficient mar-
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Table 43—Regional effects of eliminating the rice export quota
Rice Rice
Region Rice price production consumption Rice surplus
(dong/kilogram) (1,000 metric tons)
Levels with no-quota simulation
Northern Uplands 3,820 1,329 1,952 -623
Red River Delta 3,579 2,811 2,522 389
North Central Coast 3,635 1,300 1,495 -195
South Central Coast 3,310 1,039 1,047 -8
Central Highlands 3,257 258 446 -188
Southeast 2,993 561 1,086 -526
Mekong River Delta 2,946 7,692 2,400 5292
Change from base scenario  (percent)
(with quota)
Northern Uplands 18.6 7.2 -1.7 -16.4
Red River Delta 20.2 8.2 -0.9 152.3
North Central Coast 19.8 8.0 -1.1 36.6
South Central Coast 22.2 6.7 -7.4 94.7
Central Highlands 22.6 6.6 -9.3 25.9
Southeast 25.1 8.2 -7.1 19.3
Mekong River Delta 25.6 8.5 -7.7 17.8
Source: Simulation using the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model with long-run parameters.
33 In some simulations using more elastic supply and demand, even the absolute increase is smaller in the Red River
Delta and the Northern Uplands because the higher prices cause these two regions to become jointly self-sufficient
in rice, thus partially “disconnecting” their prices from those in the Mekong Delta. kets, this example demonstrates that distance and transportation costs alone can gen-
erate this phenomenon.
Second, the “interior” regions, in this context, should be defined according to the
commodity flows rather than geography. The Red River Delta is a surplus region with
a major port (Haiphong), yet its rice prices are partially insulated from world prices
and from trade policy because it does not export and because it is some distance from
the exporting region.
As mentioned in the previous section, the impact of quota removal on different
types of households can be measured by combining the price changes from the model
with household data on rice production and consumption. Because the welfare effect
is calculated based on changes in rice prices on producers and consumers, the results
do not incorporate the indirect effects of changes in other food prices, wages, and
nonfarm income. In addition, the effect of the loss of quota rents is not included. The
direct effect of higher rice prices is expected to be the largest and possibly the most
adverse, yielding a conservative estimate of the gains from export liberalization.
The first three columns of Table 44 show the average percentage change in real
income resulting from the elimination of the rice export quota. The real income of
Vietnamese households rises 1.5 percent on average, while that of poor households
(defined as the poorest 25 percent) rises 1.7 percent.TABLE 44
The real income of urban households, primarily net buyers, falls 2.8 percent as a
result of the higher prices associated with eliminating the export quota. The loss is
twice as great among the urban poor (−5.4 percent) than among the urban nonpoor
(−2.6 percent) because rice accounts for a larger share of their expenditures. Rural
households,being net sellers on average,gain from the quota removal. The rural non-
poor gain somewhat more (2.7 percent) than the rural poor (2.1 percent). This is be-
cause the farmers that produce enough rice to be net sellers are somewhat less likely
to be poor than net buyers. For example, the Mekong Delta has a high proportion of
net sellers (46 percent) and a small percentage of poor households (17 percent).
These results present an apparent paradox: on the one hand, poor households do
less well than nonpoor households in both rural and urban areas; on the other hand,
overall, poor households do better than nonpoor households. The explanation is that
redistribution between sectors, from the richer urban sector to the poorer rural sec-
tor, is progressive and outweighs regressive distribution patterns within each sector.
Looking at the regional impact on income and poverty, the gains are largest in the
two rice-surplus regions. In the Mekong and Red River deltas, average real incomes
rise 5.6 and 2.4 percent, respectively. The largest loss is in the Central Highlands,
where average income falls 2.4 percent. In the other regions, there is a mixture of
small gains and small losses (ranging from −0.8 to 0.4 percent). Poor households
generally do better than their nonpoor neighbors in the same region. This pattern is
most notable in the Red River Delta where the nonpoor include the residents of
Hanoi, who are hurt by higher rice prices, while the poor are mostly rice farmers. An
exception to this pattern is the Mekong River Delta, where the gains by the poor are
large but not as large as those of nonpoor households. The Mekong Delta is pre-
73dominantly rural, so the nonpoor households are mostly commercial farmers rather
than urban consumers.
Table 44 also shows the effect of eliminating the rice export quota on the poverty
rate34for different types of households. The poverty rate rises in the urban areas (from
7.6 to 9.1 percent), while falling in the rural areas (from 29.4 to 28.6 percent). The
overall poverty rate falls slightly from 25.0 to 24.7 percent. The poverty rate also de-
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Table 44—Distributional effects of eliminating the rice export quota
Average change in real income Poverty rate
Household category Average Poor Nonpoor Before After Population
(percent change) (percent) (percent 
of total)
Viet Nam 1.5 1.7 1.4 25.0 24.7 100.0
Location
Urban -2.8 -5.4 -2.6 7.6 9.1 20.0
Rural 2.5 2.1 2.7 29.4 28.6 80.0
Region
Northern Uplands -0.7 -0.2 -0.9 34.9 36.1 16.7
Red River Delta 2.4 4.3 1.8 25.1 23.8 24.0
North Central Coast 0.4 1.2 -0.2 40.4 41.1 13.3
South Central Coast -0.8 -0.3 -0.9 20.0 20.0 11.3
Central Highlands -2.4 -2.2 -2.4 21.9 24.4 2.7
Southeast -0.5 -0.6 -0.4 12.1 12.7 11.3
Mekong River Delta 5.6 4.0 5.9 17.2 15.4 20.7
Occupation
Farmer 3.4 2.8 3.6 30.7 29.4 73.7
Nonfarmer -3.9 -9.3 -3.4 9.1 11.8 26.3
Income group (quartile)
Poorest 1.7 1.7 N.A. 100.0 91.6 25.0
2nd 1.1 N.A. 1.1 0.0 7.6 25.0
3rd 1.7 N.A. 1.7 0.0 0.0 25.0
Richest 1.4 N.A. 1.4 0.0 0.0 25.0
Source: Simulation using the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model and household data from the Viet
Nam Living Standards Survey (see text for details).
Note: Poverty is defined as households below the 25th percentile in terms of real per capita consumption ex-
penditure. N.A. indicates not applicable (no household in that cell).
34 The poverty rate is defined as the proportion of households falling below the poverty line, defined as the 25th per-
centile of per capita consumption expenditure in the original income distribution. Sensitivity analysis shows that us-
ing poverty lines at the 10th and 50th percentiles does not significantly affect the results.clines among farmers and among households in the two surplus delta regions. The
rate rises by more than 1 percentage point among nonfarmers and households in the
Central Highlands and Northern Uplands.
Finally,Table 44 illustrates that there is some turnover in poor households as a re-
sult of the export liberalization. For 8.4 percent of the poor households, real income
rises enough to lift them above the poverty line. At the same time,7.6 percent of those
in the second quartile fall below the poverty line. The net effect is a slight (0.3 per-
centage point) reduction in the proportion of households that are poor.
Alternative Rice Export Quota Levels 
Complete export liberalization may not be politically acceptable given the negative
impact on the urban poor described above. Thus, it is useful to examine the effect of
partial liberalization. One approach would be to gradually raise the export quota.
Table 45 shows the effect of raising the quota from 2.5 to 3.0, 3.5, 4.0, and 4.5 mil-
lion tons. As the quota is relaxed, domestic rice prices and rice production increase,
while rice consumption and world rice prices decline. Because the 4.5 million ton
quota is not binding, the results are identical to the no-quota scenario shown in the
last column.TABLE 45
Table 45 shows that the implicit export tax35 falls from 22 percent with a 2.5 mil-
lion ton quota to 9 percent with a 3.5 million ton quota, reaching 0 percent when the
quota exceeds the free-market export level of 4.1 million tons. Similarly, the quota
rent falls from US$151 million to zero over the same range. The net gains from lib-
eralization (relative to the base scenario with the 2.5 million ton quota) rise as the
quota is relaxed. It is notable that the incremental benefits diminish as one approaches
complete liberalization. This is consistent with the general principle that the costs of
trade distortions rise faster than the degree of distortion as measured by the implicit
rate of tax or subsidy.
Replacing the Export Quota with an Export Tax 
In a static setting, an export quota is equivalent to an export tax in terms of its effect
on prices, production, and consumption.36 Thus, replacing the export quota with an
export tax would allow the government to limit exports and maintain low domestic
prices, while generating tax revenue. It is true that the current quota system gener-
ates revenue for the government through contributions made by the state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs), including those that export rice. These contributions, however, are
the result of negotiations rather than any specific formula, and government officials
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35 The implicit export tax is calculated as the shadow price on the quota constraint (the gap between domestic and
world prices after adjustments for marketing and polishing) as a percentage of the with-quota world price.
36 In a dynamic context, an export tax maintains a constant degree of (negative) protection over time, while allow-
ing exports to vary. In contrast, an export quota maintains a constant level of exports, allowing the degree of pro-
tection to vary depending on domestic conditions and the world price. may not be aware of the full value of the quotas. An export tax would make the
process more transparent and probably increase revenue.
Table 46 summarizes the effect of replacing the rice export quota with export taxes
at different rates. An export tax of 25 percent represents a slight increase in export
restrictions, compared with the base scenario, since the 1995 quota is equivalent to
a 22 percent export tax. Thus, such a tax depresses prices, exports, production, and
income slightly, while raising rice consumption. An export tax of 20 percent, in con-
trast, would represent a slight relaxation of export restrictions, having small effects
in the opposite direction from those just described. Further reductions in the export
tax would move prices, production, consumption, and exports gradually toward the
free-trade levels.TABLE 46
As shown in the second section of Table 46,the tax revenue declines from US$157
million for a 25 percent tax to US$50 million for a 5 percent tax. Although not shown
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Table 45—Effects of different rice export quotas
Base
scenario: Partial relaxation of export quota
2.5 millon (million ton quota) No
Variable/change ton quota 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5  quota
Rice exports  2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.1 4.1
(million metric tons)
Implicit export tax  22.4 16.3 9.4 2.1 0.0 0.0
(percent)
Quota rent (US$ million) 150.8 131.0 87.7 22.3 0.0 0.0
Change in household  0.0 42.4 101.7 177.6 201.9 201.9
income (US$ million)
Change in total income  0.0 23.8 39.8 50.3 52.3 52.3
(US$ million)
Percent change from 
base scenario
Rice price 0.0 6.0 12.8 19.9 22.0 22.0
Paddy price 0.0 7.1 15.1 23.5 25.9 25.9
Rice production 0.0 2.3 4.9 7.4 8.1 8.1
Rice consumption 0.0 -1.3 -2.6 -3.9 -4.3 -4.3
Rice exports 0.0 18.5 38.2 58.0 63.5 63.5
Rice export price 0.0 -0.6 -1.3 -1.9 -2.1 -2.1
Rice export value 0.0 17.8 36.5 54.9 60.0 60.0
Household income 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.5 1.5
Total income 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
Source: Simulation using the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model.in the table, the model suggests that tax revenue also declines if the export tax is
raised from 25 to 30 percent, because the reduction in exports more than offsets the
increase in the tax rate. This suggests that, given domestic and international condi-
tions of 1995, tax revenue would be maximized with a rate close to 25 percent. To-
tal income, however, would be maximized by an export tax rate close to zero. The
“optimal export tax” is close to zero because the export demand elasticity is high. As
shown later, assuming a more inelastic world demand for Vietnamese rice would
change this conclusion substantially.
Given the political constraints on export liberalization, one option would be to re-
place the export quota with an export tax and use part of the revenue to compensate
those households hurt by the higher rice prices. The compensation could take the
form of food-for-work or microcredit programs targeted at households and regions
known to be negatively affected by the policy. According to the analysis presented
here, rural nonfarming households, urban poor households, and rural households in
the Central Highlands would merit special attention in such programs.
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Table 46—Effects of different rice export taxes
No quota and various export taxes
25 20 15 10 5
percent percent percent percent percent
Variable/change tax tax tax tax tax No tax
Rice exports (million tons) 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.4 3.8 4.1
Tax revenue (US$ millions) 156.8 146.0 124.1 91.1 50.3 0.0
Change in household  -15.1 15.7 53.0 96.4 146.1 201.9
income (US$ million)
Change in total income  -7.9 12.1 27.5 38.8 46.8 52.3
(US$ million)
Percent change from base scenario
Rice price -2.6 2.4 7.3 12.3 17.1 22.0
Paddy price -3.0 2.8 8.7 14.5 20.2 25.9
Rice production -1.0 0.9 2.8 4.7 6.4 8.1
Rice consumption 0.6 -0.5 -1.5 -2.5 -3.4 -4.3
Rice exports -8.2 7.5 22.4 36.7 50.3 63.5
Rice export price 0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -1.2 -1.7 -2.1
Rice export value -7.9 7.2 21.5 35.0 47.8 60.0
Household income -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5
Total income -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
Price index -0.6 0.6 1.7 2.8 3.9 5.0
Source: Simulation using the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model.Sensitivity Analysis 
Given the uncertainty regarding some of the parameters, it is useful to examine the
sensitivity of the results to changes in the parameters. Table 47 shows the effect of re-
moving the export quota under alternative supply and demand elasticities. The effect
of quota removal on rice and paddy prices is not greatly affected by domestic supply
and demand elasticities. This is because, in the absence of an export quota, Mekong
rice prices are determined by the export price, and rice prices in the other regions are
largely determined by transportation costs from the Mekong Delta region.TABLE 47
Rice prices are greatly affected, however, by the export demand elasticity. If ex-
port demand is relatively inelastic,then the increase in exports depresses world prices
and thus dampens the increase in domestic prices. Similarly, an elasticity of −1,000
(close to the perfect elasticity of the small-country assumption) would result in do-
mestic prices rising virtually all the way to the original world price.
When the quota is removed, production and exports are naturally higher (lower)
with a more (less) elastic supply than in the original simulation. Rice exports are just
3.3 million tons if the price elasticity of rice supply is 0.1, but 4.9 million tons if the
elasticity is 0.6. Similarly, a more (less) elastic demand for rice means that con-
sumption falls more (less) with the elimination of the export quota. Exports are 3.8
million tons with a more inelastic demand (−0.1), compared with 4.7 million tons
with a more elastic demand (−0.6). In all scenarios, however, the quota removal re-
sults in relatively large increases in exports (32 to 93 percent).
The gains to Vietnamese households from export liberalization range from
US$149 to US$230 million within the range of parameter assumptions shown in
Table 47. The gains in total income (including the exporters= loss in quota rents) vary
between −US$1 million and US$80 million. The gains from liberalization appear to
be most sensitive to the export demand elasticity, at least given the range tested here.
If the export demand elasticity is relatively inelastic (−8), Viet Nam actually loses
slightly as a result of removing the rice export quota, though households still gain
due to the transfer from export SOEs. This is because the terms-of-trade losses re-
lated to the lower world rice price (area E in Figure 8) is greater than the reduction
in deadweight loss (areas B + D). If the export demand elasticity is high (−1,000),
implying that Vietnamese exports have virtually no effect on world prices, the gains
from liberalization are US$230 million for households and US$80 million for the na-
tion as a whole.
The income elasticity of rice has very little effect on the results because the per-
centage change in income is relatively small, much smaller than the percentage
change in prices, for example. Furthermore, the income elasticity for rice and the
other staples is modest. Thus, the feedback from food market to income back to food
markets is not large.
Given the sensitivity of the results to assumptions about the export demand elas-
ticity for Vietnamese rice, this issue is explored in more detail. Figure 9 shows the
benefits in total income and household income from different levels of export quota
and different assumptions regarding the export demand elasticity for Vietnamese rice
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Table 47—Sensitivity analysis of the effect of eliminating the rice export quota
Price elasticity of Price elasticity of Income elasticity of Price elasticity of
Original rice supply local rice demand rice demand world rice demand
Variable/change assumptions 0.1 0.6 -0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.8 -8 -1,000
Rice exports (million tons) 4.1 3.3 4.9 3.8 4.7 4.1 4.0 3.8 4.3
Change in household  201.9 216.1 188.9 208.1 193.1 201.9 203.5 148.7 229.6
income (US$ million)
Change in total income  52.3 66.5 39.3 58.5 43.5 52.3 53.9 -0.9 80.0
(US$ million)
Percent change from base scenario: 2.5 million ton export quota
Rice price 22.0 23.1 20.9 22.3 21.0 22.0 21.9 17.4 24.2
Paddy price 25.9 27.3 24.5 26.5 24.9 25.9 26.1 20.5 28.6
Rice production 8.1 2.1 13.7 8.3 7.8 8.1 8.1 6.5 8.8
Rice consumption -4.3 -4.5 -4.1 -1.0 -9.2 -4.3 -3.4 -3.4 -4.7
Rice exports 63.5 31.7 93.4 49.6 83.8 63.5 59.9 51.0 69.3
Rice export price -2.1 -1.1 -3.1 -1.7 -2.8 -2.1 -2.0 -6.4 -0.1
Rice export value 60.0 30.4 87.4 47.1 78.7 60.0 56.7 41.4 69.2
Household income 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.7
Total income 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 -0.0 0.6
Price index 5.0 5.2 4.8 5.1 4.8 5.0 5.0 4.0 5.5
Source: Simulation using the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model.(e). Household benefits (the dark lines) rise sharply as the quota is relaxed and are
not initially affected by the export demand elasticity. This is because, as long as the
quota is binding, the size of the quota (and not international prices) determine do-
mestic prices and hence household income. Once the quota becomes nonbinding,fur-
ther increases in the quota have no effect on prices or household income, so the line
in Figure 9 becomes horizontal. The more inelastic the world demand for Vietnamese
rice, the lower the free-trade level of rice exports and the sooner that the quota be-
comes nonbinding.FIGURE 9
In contrast, the effect of quota relaxation on total income (the gray lines) varies de-
pending on the export demand elasticity. Total income is the sum of household income
and the quota rents received by rice exporters. A more inelastic world demand for Viet-
namese rice implies that quota relaxation has a larger negative effect on world prices,
thus causing more rapid reduction in quota rents. When the quota becomes nonbind-
ing, the quota rent disappears and further increases in the quota have no effect.
With an inelastic world demand (−8), there are small losses because the loss of
the quota rents slightly exceeds the gains to households. In this case, a quota of 3.0
million tons is similar to an “optimal” export tax, which takes advantage of Viet
Nam’s market power to raise world prices slightly. In the base scenario, with an elas-
ticity of −12, the gains in total income from quota relaxation reach US$52 million
per year when the quota becomes nonbinding (at 4.2 million tons). Similarly, with
an elasticity of −1,000, the gains reach US$80 million when the quota becomes non-
binding (at 4.3 million tons).
These results highlight the importance of the elasticity of world demand for Viet-
namese rice exports to Viet Nam. One implication is that further research on the mag-
nitude of this elasticity would assist the formulation of rice export policy. Another
implication is that Viet Nam has a strong interest in lobbying for liberalization of
world rice markets in international fora such as the World Trade Organization and
ASEAN. Trade liberalization among rice importers would increase elasticity of world
demand for Vietnamese rice and thus increase the benefits of export liberalization in
Viet Nam.
Liberalization of Internal Marketing 
In 1995–96 when the IFPRI survey was carried out, there were various restrictions
on the movement of food, particularly rice, from one region to another. These re-
strictions took the form of fees, taxes, police checkpoints, requirements for permits,
and occasionally outright bans (see Chapter 3). In some cases, the restrictions were
implemented by government authorities and in other cases by local officials acting
on their own. The effect of these restrictions was to raise the cost of moving goods
from one region to another, thus creating a price difference between the two regions
that exceeded the cost of transportation.
In the base scenario, the price differential between two regions is not allowed to
exceed either the cost of transportation (based on the IFPRI trader survey) or the ob-
served price differential (based on government price data), whichever is greater.
80When the observed price differential is greater than the cost of transportation,the dif-
ference is likely to be related to restrictions on internal trade. The removal of these
restrictions is simulated by redefining the maximum price differential as the cost of
transportation.
Table 48 compares the national results of the base scenario (with restrictions on
internal trade) and the simulation with no internal restrictions but maintaining the ex-
port quota. Average rice and paddy prices fall slightly, as does rice production and
consumption. In spite of these modest effects,total income rises US$45.6 million (0.3
percent),almost as much as the long-term export liberalization scenario that involved
much larger average price changes. The explanation is that the national average hides
strong regional patterns.TABLE 48
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Figure 9—Benefits of relaxing the rice export quota with
alternative export demand elasticities
Source: Simulations using the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model.of reduced south-north transportation costs. These price changes cause production
to fall in the north and rise in the south, while consumption moves in the opposite
direction in each region. Thus, the Mekong rice surplus rises from 4.49 to 4.65 mil-
lion tons. Since exports are held constant by the quota, all of the additional 160,000
tons of Mekong surplus are being shipped to deficit regions within Viet Nam. At the
same time, the lower prices in the north imply that the Red River Delta surpluses are
much smaller (57,000 tons, down from 154,000 tons), leaving the region barely cov-
ering its own requirements.TABLE 49
One interesting result is that internal liberalization reduces the value of the rice
export quotas. The implicit tax associated with the quota falls from US$60 per ton
(22 percent of the world price) to US$49 per ton (18 percent). Since internal market
liberalization gives the Mekong Delta better access to rice markets in northern Viet
Nam, the export quota is less binding.
The convergence of north and south rice prices has some distributional effects as
well. Surplus rice farmers can be expected to gain in the south and lose in the north,
while urban and deficit rural households gain in the north but lose in the south. These
expectations are borne out in Table 50. The Northern Uplands, being a northern
deficit region, gains, as does the Mekong River Delta, being a southern surplus re-
gion. The Red River Delta loses, because its surplus farmers are hurt by the lower
rice prices. Urban households gain, particularly the poor. The effect on all rural
households is neutral,though the rural poor lose. Generally,the effects are small,with
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on internal on internal Percent
Variable Unit trade) trade change
Rice price Dong/kilogram 2,781 2,681 -3.6
Paddy price Dong/kilogram 1,503 1,482 -1.4
Paddy production 1,000 tons 24,949 24,845 -0.4
Rice production 1,000 tons 13,865 13,807 -0.4
Rice consumption 1,000 tons 11,333 11,275 -0.5
Rice exports 1,000 tons 2,532 2,532 0.0
Rice export price US$/ton 269 269 0.0
Rice export value US$ million 681 681 0.0
Household income US$ million/year 13,567 13,645 0.6
Total income US$ million/year 13,716 13,762 0.3
Price index base = 100 100 98 -1.2
Source: Simulation using the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model.83
Table 49—Regional effects of removing restrictions on internal trade
Rice Rice
Region Rice price production consumption Rice surplus
(dong/kilogram) (1,000 metric tons)
Levels with no restriction simulation
Northern Uplands 2,840 1,175 2,003 -828
Red River Delta 2,699 2,501 2,444 57
North Central Coast 2,848 1,172 1,515 -343
South Central Coast 2,807 984 1,116 -131
Central Highlands 2,677 242 491 -249
Southeast 2,513 524 1,152 -628
Mekong River Delta 2,466 7,209 2,555 4,654
Change from base scenario (with restrictions)
(percent)
Northern Uplands -11.8 -5.1 0.9 11.0
Red River Delta -9.4 -3.7 0.0 -63.0
North Central Coast -6.1 -2.6 0.2 11.4
South Central Coast 3.6 1.2 -1.4 -16.9
Central Highlands 0.8 -0.1 -0.3 -0.8
Southeast 5.0 1.2 -1.6 -3.7
Mekong River Delta 5.2 1.6 -1.7 3.6
Source: Simulation using the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model.
most being less than 1 percentage point. The poverty rate falls in urban areas but re-
mains unchanged among rural households. Poverty falls slightly in the three north-
ern deficit regions and in the southern surplus region (Mekong), while rising in the
two southern deficit regions and the northern surplus region. On a national level,
these effects tend to cancel each other out,leaving the overall poverty rate unaffected
by internal market liberalization.TABLE 50
What is the effect of removing restrictions on the internal movement of food and
removing the rice export quota? Table 51 reveals that internal market liberalization
would dampen the increase in prices associated with export liberalization. Rice prices
rise 22 percent as a result of quota removal alone (see Table 42), but just 14 percent
when quota removal is combined with internal market liberalization. Mekong prices
are virtually the same in the two scenarios, being set by world prices. Thus, the en-
tire reduction in south-north transportation costs is passed on to northern rice mar-
kets in the form of lower prices. Rice  exports  are  3.8  million  tons, substantially
above the quota level of 2.5 million tons but slightly below the level achieved by84
Table 50—Distributional effects of removing restrictions on internal trade
Average change in real income Poverty rate
Household category Average Poor Nonpoor Before After Population
(percent change) (percent) (percent of
total)
Viet Nam 0.1 -0.2 0.2 25.0 25.0 100.0
Location
Urban 0.4 0.8 0.4 7.6 7.5 20.0
Rural 0.0 -0.3 0.1 29.4 29.4 80.0
Region
Northern Uplands 0.7 0.5 0.8 34.9 34.7 16.7
Red River Delta -0.8 -1.5 -0.6 25.1 26.0 24.0
North Central Coast 0.0 -0.2 0.2 40.4 40.1 13.3
South Central Coast -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 20.0 19.9 11.3
Central Highlands -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 21.9 22.7 2.7
Southeast -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 12.1 12.5 11.3
Mekong River Delta 1.0 0.6 1.1 17.2 16.4 20.7
Occupation
Farmer 0.1 -0.2 0.2 30.7 30.6 73.7
Nonfarmer 0.0 -0.6 0.1 9.1 9.3 26.3
Income group (quartile)
Poorest -0.2 -0.2 N.A. 100.0 97.6 25.0
2nd -0.0 N.A. -0.0 0.0 2.5 25.0
3rd 0.2 N.A. 0.2 0.0 0.0 25.0
Richest 0.4 N.A. 0.4 0.0 0.0 25.0
Source: Simulation using the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model and household data from the Viet
Nam Living Standards Survey (see text for details).
Note: Poverty is defined as households below the 25th percentile in terms of real per capita consumption
expenditure.
quota removal alone (compare Tables 42 and 51). The reason is that internal market
liberalization facilitates shipments of Mekong surpluses to deficit regions within the
country, thus competing somewhat with exports.TABLE 51
Combining quota removal and internal liberalization raises household income
US$232 million and total income US$83 million. These figures are larger than ei-
ther reform individually, but less than the sum of the benefits. In other words, there
are no complementarities in combining internal and export liberalization, at least
within this static partial-equilibrium model. As noted above, internal market liberal-
ization provides an alternative outlet for Mekong rice surpluses, thus reducing the
implicit tax associated with the quota. As a result, the additional benefits of quota re-
moval are smaller than when starting from the base scenario with internal restrictions.The lack of complementarity between internal and export liberalization probably
reflects the specific geographic patterns of Vietnamese rice marketing rather than any
universal tendency. For example, if rice had to be transported overland from the sur-
plus region to the port, internal market liberalization would facilitate exports rather
than creating an alternative market. In this context, internal market liberalization
would make an export quota more binding,so that combining the two reforms would
generate benefits greater than the sum of the gains from the two reforms implemented
separately.
Epilogue 
The results of this analysis were presented in various seminars and workshops in late
1996. Since that time, the government has implemented some of the liberalization
measures discussed here, allowing us to make a preliminary assessment of the actual
impact of the reforms.
In March 1997, the government issued Decree No. 140/TTg, which raised the rice
export quota to 3.5 million tons and decentralized much of the quota allocation
process to provincial authorities. In addition,the decree set quotas for the whole year
rather than for a part of the year, as had been done in the past.
The quota was raised to 4.0 million tons in 1998,and four criteria were established
for private-sector participation in rice exports (Decision 12/TTg of January 1998).
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Table 51—Overall effects of eliminating the rice export quota and removing 




on internal internal Percent
Variable Unit trade) restrictions change
Rice price Dong/kilogram 2,781.2 3,176.4 14.2
Paddy price Dong/kilogram 1,503.0 1,801.7 19.9
Paddy production 1,000 tons 24,949.2 26,508.3 6.2
Rice production 1,000 tons 13,865.5 14,732.0 6.2
Rice consumption 1,000 tons 11,333.5 10,893.0 -3.9
Rice exports 1,000 tons 2,532.0 3,839.0 51.6
Rice export price US$/ton 269.0 264.4 -1.7
Rice export value US$ million 681.1 1,014.9 49.0
Household income US$ million/year 13,567.2 13,799.5 1.7
Total income US$ million/year 13,716.8 13,799.5 0.6
Price index base = 100 100.0 102.8 2.8
Source: Simulation using the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model.Later that year, export permits were temporarily suspended in response to a below-
average harvest in the north, but exports reached the quota limit in any case.
In 1999, the quota was increased to 4.5 million tons, and, for the first time, pri-
vate traders were allocated quotas, albeit just 4 percent of the total. Some observers
believe that the rice export quota is no longer binding, that Viet Nam could not ex-
port more than 4.5 million tons even without a quota (Ross Kreamer, personal
communication).
Table 52 shows the trends in rice prices during the period 1995–99, when the ex-
ports rose from 2.5 to 4.5 million tons. The retail price of rice in the Mekong Delta
has been stable or declined in dollar terms since 1995, contrary to the expected ef-
fect of export liberalization. It should be recalled, however, that the model simulates
the effect of export liberalization on domestic prices, holding other factors equal,
but other factors have not remained equal: in particular, international prices have
fallen.TABLE 52
A better measure of the impact of rice policy is to look at the margin between
Mekong prices and international prices. For international prices, the Vietnamese and
Thai export prices (f.o.b.) for 25 percent broken rice are used. As shown in the last
two columns of Table 52, Mekong prices have increased from 99 to 110 percent of
the Vietnamese f.o.b. price, and from 83 to 105 percent of Thai f.o.b. prices (pre-
sumably, they exceed world prices because of domestic marketing margins).
Decree No. 140/TTg of March 1997 also lifted restrictions on internal rice trade
and eliminated some licenses and controls on transport. Data are not available on the
volumes of rice transported from south to north, but price data suggest that the de-
cree had the expected effect of increasing north-south trade. As shown in Table 53,
retail prices in the Northern Uplands have fallen from 22 percent above Mekong
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Table 52—Comparison of domestic and export prices since 1995
Ratio of Ratio of
Viet Nam Thailand Mekong Mekong
Retail rice Retail rice f.o.b. 25 f.o.b. 25 price price
price price percent percent to 25% to 25%
Mekong Exchange Mekong broken rice  broken rice f.o.b. VN f.o.b. Thai
Year Delta rate Delta price price price price
(dong/ (dong/US$) (US$/metric tons) (ratio)
kilogram)
1995 2,760 11,043 250 252 300 0.99 0.83
1996 2,790 11,038 253 250 280 1.01 0.90
1997 2,707 11,905 227 229 254 0.99 0.90
1998 3,411 13,483 253 250 250 1.01 1.01
1999 3,162 13,963 226 205 215 1.10 1.05
Source: Compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD),Viet Nam, from Government
Price Committee data.87
Table 53—Comparison of Mekong and Red River Delta rice since 1995
Ratio of Ratio of
Nominal retail rice price Northern Red River
Northern Red River Mekong Uplands to Delta to
Year Uplands Delta River Delta Mekong price Mekong price
(dong/kilogram) (ratio)
1995 3,380 3,300 2,760 1.22 1.20
1996 3,470 3,400 2,790 1.24 1.22
1997 2,849 2,707 2,707 1.05 1.00
1998 3,595 3,448 3,411 1.05 1.01
1999 3,571 3,343 3,162 1.13 1.06
Source: Compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD),Viet Nam, from Government
Price Committee data.
prices to 13 percent above, while prices in the Red River Delta have declined from
20 percent above to 6 percent above. In both cases,the largest drop was between 1996
(before the decree) to 1997 (the year of the decree).TABLE 53
Conclusions 
VASEM is useful for examining the impact of alternative rice marketing policies.
With regard to the rice export quota, the model indicates that there is some justifica-
tion for the concern of the Vietnamese government that eliminating rice export quo-
tas would raise prices and hurt some Vietnamese households. The model confirms
that rice prices would rise 14 to 22 percent (depending on whether internal restric-
tions were also removed) and have an adverse effect on urban households, nonfarm
rural households, and households in the Central Highlands. At the same time, the
model shows that the net gains to rice farmers and consumers would be around
US$200 million. Three-quarters of this would represent a transfer from SOEs ex-
porting rice and one-quarter a net gain to the country. Furthermore, poor households
tend to gain both in absolute terms and relative to nonpoor households because they
are predominantly rural farmers who benefit from higher rice prices.
In order to phase in the effects over time, the government could liberalize rice ex-
ports slowly by replacing the quota with an export tax and gradually reducing the tax
rate. The model indicates that a 22 percent tax would be equivalent to the 2.5 million
tons quota. This option has the advantage of generating revenue that could be used
to alleviate the impact of higher rice prices through targeted assistance.
With regard to restrictions on internal movement of food, the model suggests that
the impact on average prices and incomes would be relatively small. Nonetheless,
the absolute gains are large compared to the negligible costs of such a policy.
Removing restrictions on internal trade would have substantial regional effects,however,lowering prices in the north and raising them in the south. The distributional
effects are relatively small and tend to cancel each other, so there is virtually no
change in the national poverty rate.
Since 1996 when the results of this analysis were presented, the export quota has
been relaxed significantly and the restrictions on the internal movement of rice abol-
ished. Preliminary evidence for the period 1995–99 suggest that, as expected, the
margin between the Mekong Delta price and export prices has narrowed, as have the
margins between rice prices in the north and south of Viet Nam.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusions and Policy Implications
T
he historical record is fairly clear that market liberalization has had a positive
effect on economic growth, agricultural production, and the rice sector. Rice
production responded briefly to the adoption of the contract system in 1980 and more
vigorously to the decollectivization and liberalization of trade,implemented in 1988–
90. Since that time, rice production has grown at an annual rate of more than 5 per-
cent. In 1989 Viet Nam began exporting rice and became the third largest exporter.
Contrary to the predictions of some analysts, rice exports were not only sustained,
they increased, making Viet Nam the second largest rice exporter in 1997.
What has been the effect on poverty? It is argued frequently that even if market
liberalization enhances growth and reduces poverty in the long run, the poor bear the
burden of adjustment in the short run. Although there are no estimates of changes in
Vietnamese poverty rates over time,indirect evidence suggests that this is not the case
in Viet Nam. Survey data reveal that 93 to 95 percent of the poor live in rural areas,
and rural incomes appear to have risen with the reforms. First, agricultural produc-
tion, rice production, and apparent rice consumption per capita have risen signifi-
cantly since the mid-1980s. Second, the community survey of the 1992–93 VLSS
found that 95 percent of the communes reported an improvement in living standards
over the previous five years. Of these communes, 94 percent identified agricultural
policies as the main reason for the improvement. Third,there is a consensus that own-
ership of consumer durables such as televisions and motorbikes has increased rap-
idly even in rural areas.
In spite of these gains, poverty rates are still high, and the benefits of liberaliza-
tion have probably not been distributed equally among regions and between urban
and rural areas. Policymakers are concerned about the distributional implications of
further liberalization of the rice markets, a concern that is manifested in binding rice
export quotas.
Policy Implications 
This study uses a spatial equilibrium multimarket model to simulate the impact of
alternative rice marketing policies, focusing in particular on the effects of furthermarket liberalization. The results indicate that export liberalization would raise the
price of rice and hurt the urban poor and rice-deficit households. At the same time,
the gains to the rural sector, particularly farmers in the delta regions, outweigh these
effects,resulting in a slight reduction in overall poverty and an increase in household
and national income.
The model also shows that converting the export quota into an export tax would
be one approach to achieving the distributional goals of the quota, while improving
transparency and generating government revenue for targeted antipoverty programs.
The model also highlights the fact that the gains from rice export liberalization
depend heavily on the elasticity of demand for Vietnamese rice exports on world mar-
kets. The more elastic is world rice demand, the larger the benefits to Viet Nam of
export liberalization. This implies that the government could use more accurate es-
timates of the export demand elasticity for rice in its policymaking process. In addi-
tion,it suggests that Viet Nam has a strong interest in using international fora to lobby
for trade liberalization in rice markets, particularly among importing countries.
Somewhat surprisingly, the aggregate effects on income and poverty of removing
restrictions on internal trade are of the same order of importance as the liberalization
of external trade. Internal liberalization slightly benefits the poor in urban areas and
deficit areas in the north, while it slightly penalizes the poor in rural areas.
The combination of internal and external liberalization does not necessarily result
in complementarity of effects. Even though overall income grows by more than it
does in each policy separately, it grows by less than the sum. This is more a reflec-
tion of the structure of transportation and commodity flows in Viet Nam than a gen-
eral point about the complementarity of policies.
More generally, it is clear that future growth in the rice sector depends on exports,
and export expansion depends on the development of an effective marketing system
able to meet the changing needs of domestic and international markets at low cost.
The development of such a system relies heavily on the participation of the private
sector. The private sector has responded to reforms, but it is still constrained by the
SOE monopoly on exports and limited access to credit and information. Domestic
markets are only weakly integrated as a result of an underdeveloped infrastructure
system,policy restrictions on interregional movements,and lack of transparency and
credibility of policy announcement.
The government of Viet Nam is taking steps to address these problems. In March
1997, restrictions on the internal movement of rice were abolished. In addition, the
export quota was relaxed, reaching 4.5 million tons in 1999. Finally, the government
is currently issuing export permits to some private millers in the Mekong Delta. Al-
though these are positive steps, successful market reform requires not only remov-
ing policy restrictions on trade but strengthening the role of the government in pro-
viding market information and infrastructure, supporting research and extension,
developing the legal and financial infrastructure needed to promote efficient, com-
petitive markets.
90Lessons for Other Countries 
What lessons can the Vietnamese experience with market reform offer to other coun-
tries? The first lesson is that relatively equal distribution of land assets is a key in-
gredient for the poverty-reducing effect of market reform. While in other Asian coun-
tries the proportion of landless is around 20 percent of the population in rural areas,
in Viet Nam the landless population is barely 2 percent. Most farmers are small-
holders, and even the poor have land assets that allow them to cultivate rice. Thus,
an increase in the rice price would generally imply an increase in income for the ma-
jority of farmers. A similar policy in a country where a small percentage of the pop-
ulation owns a large amount of land would probably have an adverse effect on
poverty.
Second, the potential offered by market reform cannot be translated into actual
growth unless other material and institutional conditions are in place. In the case of
rice in Viet Nam, most notable among these other conditions was a relatively good
irrigation and extension system. The government of Viet Nam invested heavily in ir-
rigation infrastructure construction and rehabilitation even before market reforms
were adopted. Its extension service was also relatively successful in disseminating
modern technology such as high-yielding varieties, fertilizers, and plant protection
techniques. The success of the technology dissemination was helped by the existence
of a relatively well-educated labor force, with literacy rates much higher than in the
majority of countries at a similar level of development. Good rice seeds, adequate ir-
rigation,and knowledge of modern agronomic techniques were largely present when
market reforms were initiated. The strong response of the private sector to market in-
centives followed.
Third, an export-oriented strategy can be consistent with food security and with
smallholder production. Policymakers’ fear that liberalizing rice exports would cre-
ate widespread food insecurity and exacerbate poverty is understandable, but this
analysis demonstrates that it is largely unfounded. Although export liberalization does
create winners and losers, the net effect on poverty is negligible or slightly positive.
Fourth, the regional and distributional dimensions need to be taken into consider-
ation in the analysis of policy reform. Since some groups will gain and others will
lose from policy reforms, nationally beneficial policies may be blocked by regions
or groups that expect to lose. Analysis in which the impact can be broken down by
region and by group helps identify and quantify these trade-offs, rather than ignor-
ing them. In fact, a better understanding of the trade-offs may be useful in designing
policies (such as transfers and taxes) that at least partially offset the distributional
bias of policy reform. A spatial equilibrium model is useful in providing a regionally
disaggregated analysis of the impact of policy. In particular, the model highlighted
the fact that the impact of trade liberalization is dampened as one moves away from
the trading region of the country. Finally, this study demonstrates how a spatial equi-
librium model can be combined with household marketing data to provide rich de-
tail on the distributional impact of policy options within and across regions.
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APPENDIX 1
Methods to Analyze Market Integration
T
he simplest way to measure market integration is to consider correlation of
price series at different markets. This is intuitively related to the idea that inte-
grated markets exhibit prices that move together. Price correlations are the easiest
way to measure these co-movements. However, the traditional tests of market inte-
gration focused on correlation coefficients of spatial prices ignore the presence of
other factors,such as general price inflation,seasonality,population growth,and pro-
curement policy (see Lele 1972 for India, Farruk 1970 for Bangladesh, Jones 1972
for Nigeria).
A second approach is to consider correlation of price differences (see Blyn 1973,
Harriss 1979, and Timmer 1974). This approach has the attractive property of inter-
preting market integration as the interdependence of price changes in different mar-
kets. Moreover,price changes would largely eliminate common trends that introduce
spurious correlation.
A third approach is to study the cointegration of price series. Prices move from
time to time, and their margins are subject to various shocks. When a long-run lin-
ear relation exists among different price series,these series are said to be cointegrated
(Engle and Granger 1987). The presence of cointegration between two series is in-
dicative of strong interdependence; its absence indicates market segmentation. Of-
ten, it is not enough to say that markets are integrated. One would like to know the
extent of integration. Segmentation occurs when there is no cointegration. Perfect in-
tegrationoccurs if the price in one market is just a translation of the price in the other
market, implying that price changes are the same. The translation factor can be in-
terpreted as a transfer cost between the two markets. Segmentation occurs when there
is no relationship between prices in different markets. However, it is only in extreme
cases that perfect integration or segmentation occurs. Most of the time, intermediate
degrees of integration occur. Analytically, the major effort is to make precise the
measurement of these different degrees of integration. This is achieved by measur-
ing the magnitude of price transmission with the help of dynamic multipliers (λij).
The analysis of dynamic adjustments also allows us to compute the speed of price
transmission.Method of Calculating Dynamic Multipliers
The immediate impact of price shocks should be distinguished from the impact that
is building over time. The process of price transmission usually takes time, owing to
the complex dynamic adjustments. Following Ravallion (1986), one can then distin-
guish between the short and the long runs and dynamic multipliers computed from
estimation of equations such as
E Q 7
where pi,t is the price of rice in market i at time t, p j,t is the price of rice in market j
at time t; Xit are exogenous variables such as seasonal dummies and time trend, and
εi,t is an error term. α i,k, β i,h, and γi are coefficients to be estimated, and mi, and n j
are the number of lags of prices in market i and j, respectively.
In the estimation,problems of simultaneity may be encountered,related to the con-
temporaneous use of price in market i and market j. Since both prices may respond
to the same type of shocks, the error term εi,t is expected to be correlated with the
price pj,t. To overcome this problem, an instrumental variables estimation of pj,t has
been used,taking lagged values of the prices of all markets included in the study. The
three lags, one for prices in market i, one for prices in market j, and one for the in-
strumental variables, are determined simultaneously by application of the Akaike in-
formation criterion (Akaike 1969).
The magnitude of price adjustment is estimated with dynamic multipliers. Dy-
namic multipliers are interpreted as the effect of a price change due to a random shock
or a shift in an exogenous variable. In the context of the model introduced above, the
cumulative effect of a shock to the price in market j on the price in market i, after k




where Et denotes the expectation operator based on information available at time t.
The full adjustment of the dynamic process described by the model is given by the




































i =+ + +
(7)
(8)
(9)Method of Calculating the Speed of Adjustment
The definition of the long term multiplier λi,j
4 allows one to define the speed of con-
vergence τi,j
4 as the first time after which the percentage deviations of the interim
multiplier from the long-term multiplier are “small enough.” That is, for a given tol-
erance limit ∈, for every k > τi,j
4, one has
E Q 1 0
In the computations, the tolerance limit has been taken equal to 1 percent.
Sometimes, the speed of the response of prices is related to the efficiency of the
market system. However, this assumption is not always valid. Rapid adjustments are
just an indication of the flexibility of the mechanism. They do not necessarily imply
well functioning systems. Within the context of this discussion,it is important to con-
sider the speed of adjustment as just one dimension of integration. Given two mar-
kets,A and B, with the same value of the magnitude of price adjustment with respect














Derivation of Welfare Measures
T
he impact of a price change on household welfare can be decomposed into the
impact on the household as a consumer of the good and the impact on the
household as a producer of the good. These two effects are considered in order.
Effect of Price Changes on Households as Consumers 
The impact of price changes on consumers is often calculated using consumer sur-
plus. A similar but more theoretically consistent concept is compensating variation,
defined as the amount of money needed to compensate a consumer for the price
change and restore the original utility level. The compensating variation change can
be written as the difference between two values of the expenditure function:
E Q 1 1
where CV is the compensating variation, e(.) is the expenditure function, p is a vec-
tor of prices, u is utility, and the subscripts refer to before (0) and after (1) the price
change. This can be approximated using a second-order Taylor-series expansion:
E Q 1 2
Using Shephard’s lemma and replacing (p1i - p0i) by ∆pi yields
E Q 1 3
where hi(p0,u0) is the Hicksian demand for the good i given the original price vec-
tor p0. If the Hicksian demand is replaced with qi(p0,x0), the Marshallian demand at
the original income level, the expression is the same as that used in the calculation
of real income within the Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model
(VASEM) (see equation 4 in Appendix 4).





























































(13)A slightly different form of the same equation is used to calculate the household-
level welfare impact of rice price changes. To simplify, the calculations are limited
to the impact of changes in the rice price on purchasing power. The partial in the sec-
ond term is converted into the Hicksian own-price elasticity of demand,replacing the
Hicksian demand, h(p0,u0), with the Marshallian demand at the original income
level, q(p0,x0), where x0 is the original income, giving the following:
E Q 1 4
where qr and pr are the quantity demanded and the price of rice, respectively, and
∈rr
H is the own-price Hicksian demand elasticity of rice. After dividing both sides
by the original income (x0) and multiplying the top and bottom of the right side by
P0r, the result is
E Q 1 5
Finally, CRr, the consumption ratio for rice, which is defined as the value of rice
consumption as a proportion of income (or total expenditure), is substituted:
E Q 1 6
Effect of Price Changes on Households as Producers
Turning to the effect of a price change on the household as producer, the algebra is
similar to that described above except that one starts with the profit function. The
change in income can be written as follows:
E Q 1 7
where ∆x is the change in income, π(.) is the profit function, p is a vector of output
prices, w is a vector of input prices, z is a vector of fixed factor quantities, and the
subscripts refer to before (0) and after (1) the price change. This can be approximated
using a second-order Taylor-series expansion:

























































































































Using Shephard’s lemma and replacing (p1i - p0i) by ∆pi gives
E Q 1 9
where si(p0,w,z) is the supply of good i given the original price vector p0. This is the
expression used to calculate nominal income in VASEM (see equations 3 and 4 in
Appendix 4).
A simplified version of this equation is used to calculate the household-level im-
pact of rice price changes. Because the calculations are limited to the impact of a sin-
gle producer price (that of rice) on farm income, the product subscripts are dropped.
The partial in the second term is converted into a supply price elasticity (εij
S):
E Q 2 0
where sr and pr refer to the supply and price of rice, respectively, and the elasticity
εrr
S is the own-price elasticity of rice supply. After dividing both sides by the origi-
nal income (x0) and multiplying the top and bottom of the right side by p0r, the re-
sult is
E Q 2 1
Finally, PRr, the production ratio for rice, is defined as the value of rice production
as a proportion of income (or total expenditure):
E Q 2 2
Combining equations (16) (the impact of retail price changes on consuming house-
holds) and equation (22) (the effect of producer price changes on farm households),
the following expression is obtained:
E Q 2 3
where ∆w2 (= ∆x – CV) is the second-order approximation of the net welfare effect
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tinguish between the prices used to value rice production and consumption, respec-
tively.
This expression incorporates the response of consumers and producers to the price
change. The immediate welfare impact of the price change is obtained by setting the
elasticities equal to zero:
E Q 2 4



















he price elasticity of export demand is the percentage change in export demand
facing a country given a 1 percent change in its export price,taking into account
the response of both importers and other exporters. This is equivalent to the change
in a country’s exports necessary to cause a 1 percent change in world price. The
“small-country assumption” is that the level of exports (or imports) does not affect
the price it receives, implying that the elasticity of export demand is minus infinity.
One method of obtaining export demand elasticities is to estimate them econo-
metrically with time-series data by regressing export demand on the export price and
other variables. This approach has a number of methodological problems including
measurement error (the prices may vary due to changes in quality), endogeneity (the
volume of exports affects export prices),and omitted variables. It is argued that these
errors tend to bias the estimated elasticities toward zero (Tyers and Anderson 1988).
A second method is to calculate the export demand elasticity using information
from all other countries on supply and demand elasticities, production and con-
sumption volumes,and elasticities of price transmission. This type of analysis is usu-
ally carried out using a model of world agricultural trade. The elasticity of export de-
mand for a reference country (εxr) can be expressed in terms of the elasticity of net
import demand by all other countries (εmi): E Q 2 5
where Xr is exports from the reference country, Mi is net imports by country i (i≠r),
P is price, and θir is the elasticity of prices in country i with respect to the price in the
reference country. The elasticity of net import demand for country i (εmi) can be ex-
pressed in terms of domestic supply and demand elasticities (εSand εD,respectively).












































Foreign Demand Elasticity for
Vietnamese Rice
(25)Combining these two equations gives E Q 2 7
Other things being equal, the export demand will be more elastic when (1) exports
from the reference country are small relative to world production, (2) the supply and
demand elasticities in importing and exporting countries are large in absolute value,
and (3) the elasticity of price transmission is high.
Two econometric studies of the export demand for Thai rice have been carried out.
Using data from the 1950s and 1960s, Tsujii (1973) estimated the export demand
elasticity for Thailand to be near unity. Wong (1978), using more recent data, esti-
mated the short-run price elasticity of export demand for Thai rice at −4.0. The World
Bank (1983) endorsed this estimate, stating that the long-run elasticity would be in
the neighborhood of −10.
A number of multiregional models of world agricultural trade have been developed.
One of the most comprehensive models is the Grains, Livestock, and Sugar (GLS)
model developed by Tyers and Anderson (1988). It includes seven commodity groups
and 30 countries/regions and uses a dynamic structure allowing it to forecast short-
and long-run effects of policy intervention. According to this model, the export de-
mand elasticity for Thai rice is −8.3 in the short run and −17.3 in the long run.
The export demand elasticity for Vietnamese rice can be approximated by adjust-
ing the Thai elasticities, using the ratio of world production to country exports. In
1980–82 (the reference years for the GLS model), world rice production (264 mil-
lion tons) was 85 times larger than Thai exports (3.1 million tons). In 1995, world
production (371 million tons) was 148 times larger than Vietnamese exports. If the
elasticities of supply,demand,and price transmission are assumed to be constant,the
export demand elasticity for Vietnamese rice in 1995 would be 1.74 times larger than
the elasticity for Thai rice in 1980–82. Using the results of Tyers and Anderson
(1992),this would imply elasticities of export demand for Vietnamese rice to be –14.4
in the short run and –30.1 in the long run. Given the trend toward reducing trade bar-
riers,including the relaxation of rice self-sufficiency policies in Indonesia,it is likely
that the price transmission elasticity has increased since 1980–82. Thus,–15 and –30
are adopted here as the short- and long-run elasticities of export demand for Viet-
namese rice.





























































































he Viet Nam Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model (VASEM) consists of 12
blocks of equations and 12 sets of endogenous variables (see the list below). The
model is written in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS),using the mixed
complementarity programming (MCP) solver (Brooke,Kendrick,and Meeraus 1992).
MCP is an algorithm for finding the values of the endogenous variables that satisfy
a set of equations and inequalities (Rutherford 1995).
The supply of each commodity in each region is a function of the four commod-
ity prices in that region (equation 1) . For simplicity,a log-linear specification of sup-
ply is used. The own-price elasticities are derived from a time-series analysis of
supply response in Viet Nam (Khiem and Pingali 1996). The cross-price elasticities
are derived under the assumption that half of the area taken in (out) of a given crop
is reallocated proportionately to the other three crops.
Demand (equation 2) is specified using the linear approximation of the Almost
Ideal Demand System (Deaton and Muelbauer 1980). The income and price elastic-
ities were estimated using household data from the Viet Nam Living Standards Sur-
vey (VLSS)(GSO 1994; World Bank 1995b).
Nominal per capita income (equation 3) is calculated as the sum of the original
income plus a second-order (trapezoidal) approximation of the producer surplus re-
sulting from the change in prices. Real per capita income (equation 4) is nominal per
capita income minus a second-order approximation of the consumer surplus associ-
ated with the price changes.
The price used for valuing output (equation 5) is a weighted average of consumer
and farm gate prices,where the weights are the regional share of output sold and con-
sumed at home, respectively.37
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APPENDIX 4
Description of the Viet Nam 
Agricultural Spatial Equilibrium Model
37 This approach was adopted for two reasons. First, it is consistent with the valuation of agricultural production in
the VLSS, which was the source of the income data in the model. Second, this method reflects the fact that for com-
mercial rice growers, the opportunity cost of rice production is the producer price, while for the 51 percent of rural
households that are net rice buyers, the opportunity cost is the consumer price. Since Viet Nam now accounts for 10 to 12 percent of world rice exports,it is prefer-
able to treat it as a “large country” in international rice markets. World rice prices are
made a function of Vietnamese rice exports and the price elasticity of world demand
for Vietnamese rice is −15 in the short run and −30 in the long run (equation 6).
Three inequalities define the spatial relationships among prices. One (equation 7)
ensures that domestic price differentials do not exceed the larger of (1) the estimated
cost of transportation between the regions and (2) the price differentials observed in
1995. The other two inequalities (equations 8 and 9) keep domestic prices below the
import parity price and above the export parity price, respectively, for each crop in
each region.
Two inequalities maintain the commodity balance in each region, one connecting
supply and outflows (equation 10) and the other connecting demand and inflows
(equation 11). And one inequality keeps rice exports less than or equal to the rice ex-
port quota (equation 12).
Label Equation Number in model
1 Supply 28
2 Demand 28
3 Nominal per capita income 7
4 Real per capita income 7
5 Price for valuing output 28
6 World demand for rice 1
7 Inflows 28
8 Outflows 28
9 Domestic price relations 196
10 Import-domestic price relations 28
11 Export-domestic price relations 28
12 Export quota 4
411
Symbol Endogenous variable Number in model
BScr Budget share for commodity c in region r 28
Scr Supply of commodity c in region r 28
PScr Producer price for commodity c in region r 28
PPcr Price for valuing output of commodity c in region r 28
PDcr Consumer price for commodity c in region r 28
Mcr Imports of commodity c into region r 28
Xcr Export of commodity c from region r 28
PXrice Export (f.o.b.) price of rice 1
TQcrr' Quantities of commodity c transported from region r to region r' 196
Yr Nominal per capita income in region r 7
YRr Real per capita income in region r 7




S Constant in the supply equation of crop c in region r
βcc'r
S Coefficient for the effect of the price of crop c' on the supply of crop c in region r
αcr
D Constant in the demand equation for crop c in region r
βcc'r
D Coefficient for the effect of the price of commodity c' on the demand for commodity c in region r
θcr Coefficient for the effect of income on the demand for commodity c in region r
Yr
0 Original per capita income in region r
PPcr
0 Original price for valuing output of commodity c in region r
ωcr Share of output sold for commodity c in region r
SScc'r Partial derivative of the supply of commodity c with respect to the price of commodity c' in
region r
αW Constant in the world demand for Vietnamese rice
βW Price coefficient of the world demand for Vietnamese rice
POPr Population of region r
TPrr' Transportation costs from region r to region r'
ITXcrr' Implicit tax on internal transportation of commodity c from region r to region r'
PMc Import (c.i.f.) price of commodity c
PXc Export (f.o.b.) price of commodity c (PXrice is an endogenous variable)
QUOTAc Export quota on crop c
1. Supply:
2. Demand
3. Nominal per capita income
Y
r Y
r =+  
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1044. Real per capita income
5. Price for valuing output
6. World demand for Vietnamese rice
7. Outflows
8. Inflows
9. Domestic price relations
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